N. 5520

UNCLASSIFIED

JUN 21 1965

OPERATIONS REPULSE

RESUPPLY BY AIR BELGIUM DECEMBER, 1944

Classification changed to [redacted]
by authority of AC of S, G-2, WDGS
by [redacted]
E. S. JOHNSTON
Colonel, Infantry
SEP 12 1945

Classification changed to [redacted]
FEB 1945
by authority of CG IXTCC, See letter inside front cover.
by [redacted]
E. S. JOHNSTON
Colonel, Infantry
CUSTODIAN

HEADQUARTERS IX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted] 5520-2

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]
.Auth: CG IX TCC.
.Date: 23 Jan 45.
.Init: [redacted].
E-HFN-9

HEADQUARTERS
IX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND

AG 311.5 (23 Jan 45)

APO 133, U S Army
23 January 1945

SUBJECT: Reclassification of Documents.

TO : See Distribution.

Under the provision of paragraph 15, AR 380-5, the classification of TOP SECRET documents originating at this headquarters pertaining to Operation REPULSE is downgraded to SECRET.

For the Commanding General:

O W HOWLAND
Colonel A G D
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, AAF
C-in-C, SHAEF
CG, USSTAF
CG, FAAA
AOC, Fighter Command, RAF
CG, 18th Corps
Hq, Airborne Troops (Br)
CG, 101st A/B Div
CG, 82nd A/B Div
CG, 17th A/B Div
CG, Eighth Air Force
CG, Ninth Air Force
AOC, 38 Group, RAF
AOC, 46 Group, RAF
AOC, Bomber Command
AOC, Coastal Command
CG, 50th TC Wing
CG, 52nd TC Wing
CO, 53rd TC Wing
CO, IX TC Pathfinder Group
AOC, 11 Group, RAF
CO, IX TC Service Wing (Prov)
Air Ministry
CG, 6th A/B Div (Br)
Army & Navy Staff College
CG, I TCC (Stout Field, Ind.)
Comd & Gen Staff Sch (Leavenworth, Kans)
Airborne Trng Center (Camp McCall, N.C.)

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

2 FEB 1945

ACS # LO-41044
PO Rec # 172540

REG. NO. A-55

COPY NO. 196

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, IX TCC:
:Date: 6/1/44 :
:Init: [illegible] :

HEADQUARTERS
IX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND

E-HN-1

APO 133, US Army
3 January 1945

SUBJECT: Report on Operation "REPULSE".

THRU : Commanding General, First Allied Airborne Army, APO 470, US Army.
-and-
Commanding General, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, APO 633, US Army.

TO : Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Submitted herewith, for your information, is a report prepared by this headquarters on Operation REPULSE, which was resupply by air and movement of airborne troops for the period 23 December to 29 December 1944, inclusive.

2. REPULSE is the code name selected by this headquarters to identify these operations.

PAUL L. WILLIAMS
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

3 cys CG, AAF

Information copies to:

3 cys C-in-C SHAEF
5 cys CG, USSTAF
10 cys CG, FAAA
3 cys Fighter Command
5 cys CG, 18th Corps, USA
5 cys Hq, Airborne Troops (BR)
3 cys CG, 101st A/B Div
3 cys CG, 82nd A/B Div
3 cys CG, 17th A/B Div
2 cys CG, Eighth Air Force
2 cys CG, Ninth Air Force
3 cys AOC, 38 Group
3 cys AOC, 46 Group
2 cys Bomber Command
2 cys Coastal Command
5 cys CG, 52nd TC Wing
5 cys CG, 50th TC Wing
5 cys CO, 53rd TC Wing
3 cys CO, IX TCC P/F Group
3 cys AOC, 11 Group
2 cys CO, IX TCC Service Wing
2 cys Air Ministry
2 cys CG, 6th British A/B Div
1 cy Army & Navy Staff College
92 cys CG, FAA (additional)

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

[redacted] UNCLASSIFIED

Auth: CG, IX TCC
Date: 4/11/47
Init: [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS
IX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND

E-LTG-1

APO 133, US Army
3 January 1945

REPORT ON OPERATION "REPULSE"

INTRODUCTION.

1. On 16 December 1944, the German Army began a strenuous drive against the American front between the First and Ninth US Armies, and proceeded to make unanticipated headway.

2. IX Troop Carrier Command, located in England, had just previously been relieved of most of their air-freight commitments and was preparing to go into strenuous air-training using the XVIII American Airborne Corps and the 6th British Airborne Division when the German advance began. The 82nd and 101st American Airborne Divisions had been relieved from the HOLLAND area and were re-equipping themselves for further air-training with an eye to future airborne operations. When the news broke and the threat became serious, they were immediately called from reserve and thrown into the battle in an effort to stop the German advance. In the fighting that followed, the 101st Airborne Division was encircled in the town of BASTOGNE, BELGIUM, along with other smaller units that were encircled elsewhere. Through General PATTON'S Third Army, the 101st Airborne Division made their first request for resupply and SHAEF AIR transmitted that request to IX Troop Carrier Command. Previous to this request, the First Army had requested resupply to the extent of one hundred and twenty-seven (127) aircraft loads on 18 December 1944, but weather prevented this mission from being accomplished. However, twenty-one (21) aircraft had taken off from the United Kingdom, but were unable to reach the Drop Zone, consequently, they were diverted to A-41 on the continent, where they were unloaded.

3. The following report is purely from the tactical angle of the operation as pertains to the use of Troop Carrier personnel and equipment. Information as to what was actually supplied, i.e., in breakdown, will not be available until the Quartermaster Packing Units can furnish us with this data.

4. Generally speaking, the vast majority of this work was accomplished to resupply the 101st Airborne Division. Two (2) minor attempts were made to resupply a group of one thousand (1000) men at MARCOURAY, BELGIUM, both of which were unsuccessful. One (1) mission was set up for the First Army, but this was cancelled due to weather. Along with these aerial resupply missions, IX Troop Carrier Command was committed to move the 17th Airborne Division to the continent as rapidly as possible.

[redacted] UNCLASSIFIED

I. PRELIMINARY STUDY.

1. A thorough study of this Operation was not possible due to the confused situation that existed at the time original missions were requested. Fortunately, Troop Carrier Units were mainly concentrated on air-training programs and consequently were available for immediate action. Two (2) Wings were staged in the United Kingdom and one (1) on the Continent, which afforded operations from either source in the event the weather should close down on any one. Intelligence information was readily available and accurate, thus aiding greatly in determining routes safe for Troop Carrier aircraft.

II. OPERATIONS

1. Operation REPULSE, as conducted by IX Troop Carrier Command, may be broken down into the following phases, which are in chronological order:

a. Resupply to the First Army.

b. Resupply to the 101st Airborne Division.

(1) Pathfinder Activities.

(2) Parachute Resupply.

(a) Summary of Air-lift.

(3) Glider Resupply.

(4) Navigational Aids.

(5) Tactics and Air Support.

(6) Weather Summary.

c. Resupply to Isolated Unit at MARCOURAY, BELGIUM.

d. Movement of 17th Airborne Division to the Continent.

e. Summary of Emergency Missions.

2. Resupply to the First Army.

a. Resupply for Divisions of the First Army was called for through SHAEF AIR on 18 December 1944. The request was for one hundred and twenty-seven (127) aircraft loads, but this mission was not accomplished due to adverse weather conditions. However, twenty-one (21) aircraft did depart from the United Kingdom, but were unable to reach the target area and were diverted to airstrip A-41 (a 50th Troop Carrier Wing station on the Continent). This load was later flown into the 101st Airborne Division.

3. Resupply to the 101st Airborne Division.

a. Pathfinder Activities.

(1) On 22 December, it was decided to send a pathfinder team into the BASTOGNE area of the 101st Airborne Division. This decision was made as soon as it was definite that the 101st Airborne would need aerial resupply. It was felt that with an instructed pathfinder team on the ground, resupply by air could be accomplished under instrument conditions as the weather at this time was generally poor, and, in extreme emergencies it is possible to guarantee 70% effective air-dropped resupply. Two (2) aircraft and two (2) pathfinder teams of the 101st Airborne Division were used, but due to the fact that weather and time did not permit subsequent resupply serials to fly that day, this mission was postponed until the morning of 23 December 1944 at which time the two (2) pathfinder aircraft of IX Troop Carrier Command Pathfinder Group were dispatched to the Drop Zone and accomplished their mission. The lead ship of this two (2) ship element checked the results of their work by flying back on course a half hour after dropping and using the aids as set up by the team on the ground. This was the only tactical use of the pathfinder aircraft during this entire emergency resupply period.

(2) Other missions accomplished by the Pathfinder Group were tactical resupply missions as follows:

(a) 23 December 1944 - 40 aircraft.

(b) 24 December 1944 - 6 aircraft.

(c) 27 December 1944 - 7 aircraft.

These aircraft were dispatched in the movement of the 17th Airborne Division. It was also decided that in the event weather should close down the United Kingdom, but still enabling the 50th Troop Carrier Wing to fly from the continent that it would be wise to have pathfinder aircraft and teams available on the continent. Consequently, three (3) aircraft and three (3) teams of the 101st Airborne Division were dispatched on 25 December 1944 to the 50th Troop Carrier Wing to come under their operational control, and to be used as and when deemed necessary. To date, they have not been called for, but are available.

(3) Routes.

(a) All pathfinder aircraft used the following routes:

Take-off airfield	CHALGROVE, UK
Command Departure Point	BEACHY HEAD, UK
Landfall	LE TREPORT, FRANCE
Turning Point	AIRSTRIP A-62
Initial Point	LEGLISE
Drop Zone	P 439817

(4) Battle Damage.

(a) From a total of forty-two (42) aircraft dispatched, thirty-five (35) suffered battle damage, four (4) crashed, and three (3) returned undamaged. For a complete analysis of actual battle damages sustained, see Annex No. 1, "Battle Damage Report of IX Troop Carrier Pathfinder Group.

4. Parachute Resupply.

a. The work of parachute resupply constituted the majority of air supply missions flown. It is believed, at this writing, that the total tonnage dropped to the 101st Airborne Division exceeds the resupply missions accomplished in HOLLAND. A brief summary of the parachute resupply serials flown to the 101st Airborne Division is as follows:

DATE	AIRCRAFT	LOSSES	% SUCCESS
23 December 44	262	8	98.0
24 December 44	161	0	100.0
25 December 44	0	0	0.0
26 December 44	289	1	100.0
27 December 44	138	0	100.0
TOTAL	850	9	

b. Routes.

(1) The first twenty-one (21) parachute resupply aircraft to fly into the 101st Airborne Division at BASTOGNE after the pathfinder aircraft were from stations on the Continent. These aircraft flew direct to A-78, then on to the Drop Zone, which is an approach from the West and required them to fly over enemy territory longer than if a direct approach from the South had been made. These aircraft suffered battle damage and lost one (1) aircraft shot down over the Drop Zone.

(2) Shortly after the above, two hundred and forty-one (241) aircraft from the United Kingdom approached the Drop Zone at BASTOGNE from the South, using A-91 as their Initial Point. These aireraft approached A-91 direct from the United Kingdom (see Navigation Diagram, Annex No. 2). Losses sustained by this flight were seven (7) aircraft. This route was changed on the following operation only to the extent that the Initial Point was sited further east at MONTMEDY. This route was used for all subsequent parachute resupply to the 101st Airborne Division from the United Kingdom. The reason for changing the Initial Point was due to the tactical situation which had caused an inverted "V" to be formed above BASTOGNE (as the enemy closed off the city), thereby leaving only the area between its apex open to Troop Carrier Command as a route comparatively free of enemy flak.

(3) Parachute serials were built up out of aircraft available at the time missions were requested, and due to the extremely poor weather, it was never quite possible to tell just how many aircraft would be obtainable at any given period due to the fact that some Troop Carrier stations would be closed down with one hundred (100) yards, or less, visibility due to heavy fog, while others would be flyable. Also, once aircraft were dispatched, it was impossible to tell whether they would be able to return to the United Kingdom again. Many aircraft had to be diverted to stations on the Continent and to stations other than their own in the United Kingdom.

(4) Credit must be given here for the extremely meritorious way in which the 490th Quartermaster Unit wholeheartedly worked in order to make this mission a success. This unit packed and loaded all the containers for all the drops on shortest notice, and even managed to move a unit of their organization, plus equipment, to the Continent in order to work from there.

(5) On 26 December 1944, combat crews of IX Troop Carrier Command accomplished one of the outstanding missions. Two hundred eighty-nine (289) aircraft took off on instruments and assembled on top of the fog and proceeded to complete their mission and return to England, where weather conditions were only partially better than at the time of take-off.

c. Summary of Air Lift.

(1) 23 December 1944.

(a) Parachute Delivery

Quartermaster	48 Tons	For 101st A/B Div
Ordnance	179¾ "	"
Medical	5 "	"
P O L	12 "	For Ground Forces
Total	244¾ Tons	

(b) Airlanded

Ordnance	12½ Tons	For 101st A/B Div

(2) 24 December 1944.

(a) Parachute Delivery

Ordnance	234½ Tons	For 101st A/B Div
Signal	3½ "	"
P O L	6½ "	For Ground Forces
Ordnance	3½ "	For 101st A/B Div
Ordnance	18 "	For Ground Forces
Total	266 Tons	

(3) 25 December 1944.

(a) Parachute Delivery

Nil

(b) Airlanded

Ordnance	27 Tons	For 101st A/B Div

(4) 26 December 1944.

(a) Parachute Delivery

Quartermaster	20¾ Tons	For 101st A/B Div
Medical	3½ "	"
Ordnance	93¾ "	"
P O L	7 "	"
Signal	44¼ "	"
Total	169¼ Tons	

(5) 27 December 1944.

(a) Parachute Delivery

Ordnance	118½ Tons	For 101st A/B Div
P O L	8¼ Tons	"
Total	126¾ Tons	

(6) 28 December 1944.

(a) Parachute Delivery

Nil

(b) Airlanded

Medical	10 Tons	For 101st A/B Div

(7) Parachute Delivery for 101st A/B Division.

Quartermaster	68¾ Tons	
Ordnance	626½ "	
Medical	8½ "	
Signal	47¾ "	
P O L	18¾ "	
TOTALS	770¼ Tons	

(8) Parachute Delivery for Ground Units.

P O L	18½ Tons	
Ordnance	18 "	
TOTALS	36½ Tons	

(9) Airlanded Supplies for 101st A/B Division.

Ordnance	39½ Tons	
Medical	10 "	
TOTALS	49½ Tons	

5. Glider Resupply.

a. On the night of 25 December 1944, it was requested by SHAEF that resupply for the following day was imperative inasmuch as no aircraft had flown on 25 December 1944, due to all stations in the United Kingdom having less than

one hundred (100) yards average visibility in heavy fog. Also, it was anticipated that weather would continue to keep all aircraft grounded in the United Kingdom on 26 December 1944. Consequently, it was decided to prepare the 50th Troop Carrier Wing on the continent for resupply. This offered another problem, as parachute containers were not available on the continent. A parapacking unit had been alerted to be sent to the continent and loaded in the United Kingdom, but this too was held up due to weather. The only solution to all these problems was to use gliders, whose loading would be no problem, as supplies had been delivered to Troop Carrier airfield A-50, on the continent.

b. The glider serials flown from A-50 were as follows:

Morning -	26 Dec 44	1 glider	Medical personnel and equipment
Afternoon -	26 Dec 44	10 gliders	Supplies
	27 Dec 44	50 gliders	Supplies

NOTE: Missions for 26 December 44 were 100% successful. Mission for 27 December 1944 was 70% successful.

c. It is interesting to note that some of these gliders were the same gliders that had participated in Operations MARKET and NEPTUNE. Some gliders, used in Operation MARKET, after being rebuilt at Troop Carrier Command Reclamation Wing at SON, HOLLAND, were evacuated and flown to the 50th Troop Carrier Wing at A-39 on the Continent.

d. A study of possible glider landing zones in the BASTOGNE area showed good possibilities for glider work. This was later verified when photographs were available.

e. Routes.

(1) The route flown by the glider serials of the 50th Troop Carrier Wing was as proposed by the Advanced Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, who were in a position to know the disposition of enemy troops accurately. This route, with variances in take-off airdromes, was generally as follows:

> From 50th Wing area to VP 281060, MONTHEDY, then to a point P 3345, then to a point P 4555, then directly to the Drop Zone just North of the town of BASTOGNE, P 439817.

All serials made a left turn after release and returned on a reciprocal course. This route did not correspond to the para-

chute aircraft route, but was believed safe at the time, due to the fact that aircraft and gliders experienced no difficulty on the operation of 26 December 1944.

f. Formations.

(1) Glider formations flown were not orthodox troop carrier formations, due to difficulty in weather. Two ship elements, echeloned to the right were used because the corridor was thought to be narrow and difficulty was also anticipated in loading and take-off. This proved satisfactory for the initial day operations where small numbers were involved, but for the second days work, it was felt that the normal four ship element, echeloned to the right, would have proved less disasterous. The points to be brought out are as follows:

(a) That the glider serial required, was of fifty (50) aircraft, which is a normal operations serial.

(b) That such a serial, flown in elements of two (2), required twice the time to pass over a given point, or twelve (12) minutes, i.e., six (6) minutes additional exposure to enemy fire.

(c) That such a serial, flown in elements of four, echeloned to the right, required only six (6) minutes to pass over a given point.

(d) That by this experience, we have further confirmed the desirability of glider serials flown in four (4) ship elements, echeloned to the right.

g. Altitudes.

(1) Altitudes flown were seven hundred (700) feet above the surface of the ground.

6. Navigational Aids.

a. Mission REFULSE developed with such rapidity that it was impossible to install the usual thorough Troop Carrier route navigational aids. Also, the continuation of the mission was so uncertain, the commitments so variable, and the route so changeable, that it was considered impractical to establish fixed route aids on the Continent. In view of the many established navigational aids already operating in the United Kingdom and on the Continent, the Pathfinder Group was called on to place an H/F beacon and an Eureka beacon on A-70 for airlanding of the 17th Airborne Division. Also, the 52nd Troop Carrier Wing placed a control team on A-70 to control and direct traffic. MIDNITE airway aids were

used to air land 17th Airborne Division troops on A-70 and A-63 at night. This is a milestone in the application of American peacetime flying technique to tactical use upon the war torn Continent of Europe. This represents the first time a lighted airway has been used to transport airborne troops to within seventy-five (75) miles of the enemy lines. MIDNITE aids were also used in the diversion of United Kingdom based aircraft to the 50th Wing area on the Continent. This was utilized when United Kingdom weather folded below landing minimums at night. For complete information on MIDNITE routes, see Annex No. 3.

b. The Pathfinder Group was also called on to establish navigational and target aids in the area held by the 101st Airborne Division at BASTOGNE. The 101st Pathfinder Detachment was dropped on DZ "O" on 23 December 1944. Their equipment was as follows:

		Channel	Color	Code
6 ea	Eureka	E C	-	O
4 ea	CRN-4	1558	-	-
1 ea	Eureka Battery	-	-	-
1 ea	CRN-4 Battery	-	-	-
14 ea	Panels "T"	-	Red	-
14 ea	Panels, Letter	-	White	O
14 ea	Holophane Lights	-	Red	O
4 ea	Case Smoke Grenades	-	Red	-

c. Troop Carrier units were enthusiastic in their reports concerning the high percentage of successful utilization of the aids on the DZ located in the BASTOGNE area. Also, the aids shown in Annex No 3 were indispensable in maintaining operational control of the large number of aircraft involved in this Operation. VHF stations, located at ASHFORD and FORD, were indispensable in aircraft diversions caused by poor weather at terminal bases in the United Kingdom.

d. In conclusion, it is felt that the utilization of available navigational aids already in operation was highly instrumental in the successful resupply of the 101st Airborne Division. Also, the aids established on the DZ were indispensable to the successful outcome of Operation REPULSE.

7. Tactics and Air Support.

a. Normal Troop Carrier tactics were used on all of the parachute resupply missions. The basic element of flight was a three (3) ship "V" built up into a nine (9) ship formation. Glider missions were flown in echelon to the right, two (2) ship flights. This is not SOP, but due to circumstances, it was thought best at the time (see par 5f, "Glider Formations").

b. Close cooperation was furnished by fighter and fighter-bombers of the Ninth Air Force, who did an excellent job of close cover and strafing of gunfiring positions. It was fortunate that communications were good from

IX troop Carrier Command Headquarters to Ninth Air Force Headquarters near Luxembourg. Contact was kept up all during the operations, and cover was laid on by giving Ninth Air Force the times over the Initial Point for each troop carrier serial. Ninth Air Force dispatched their fighters to pick up the incoming serials and also to provide area cover for the time Troop Carrier aircraft were in the danger area. The number of fighter aircraft involved was a decision of Ninth Air Force, who had numerous other missions to accomplish and consequently, had to allot their aircraft in accordance with the priority of each mission.

8. Weather Summary.

a. 21 December 1944.

The high pressure ridge, extending from the strong high over Russia to the Azores across northern France, was maintained during the day. A rather weak occluded front lay NS across eastern England in morning and moved slowly East into the North Sea during the day. Very poor conditions were forecast for most of France and Low Countries when low stratus cloud and poor visibility were expected and very poor cloud conditions in and ahead of front over England. 50th Wing area had visibilities in morning at less than a mile and much cloud during the day with ceilings often less than 1000 feet above ground. 52nd and 53rd Wing bases had much low cloud at less than 800-1000 feet above ground in AM with some large patches persisting at these levels in PM. Visibilities were generally 800-2000 yards during day. The passage of the occlusion across eastern England was of little assistance in improving the weather conditions over the Isles as the warmer, moist air, following the front, was conducive to prolonged poor visibility and low cloud. A warm front moved quickly over Ireland onto England after dusk while late in the day the ridge appeared to be developing further and forming a center just SW of England, precursory of a long period of stagnant weather.

b. 22 December 1944.

The occlusion, which has passed into the North Sea, moved on further east very slowly to a line Denmark to Paris, thru Low Countries. The warm front from the west penetrated to eastern England at dawn. These two fronts introduced moist, stable air onto the Isles, which, combined with the increased building up of pressure over the ridge from Russia through northern France to the Azores, warranted a rather pessimestic outlook. It was obvious that the cold front, approaching the Isles from the Atlantic, could not expect to penetrate the strong high pressure and move over the Isles with an outbreak of fresher air and better flying conditions. Very poor visibility and much low cloud was forecast for the day with only moderate improvements in visibility in afternoon. Visibility ranged 500-2500 yards over England and 1 - 3 miles over the continent with much cloud, commonly less than 800-1000 feet above ground and with light rain in frontal zones. It became evident later in the day that the high pressure center SW of the Isles was moving slowly NE and beginning to force the two fronts which had moved to Denmark-Central France and to East Anglia to stop and move backwards from E to W very slowly, recrossing areas previously crossed W to E.

Although the fronts were becoming very weak and diffused, their continued presence over the area was conducive to persistent low cloud and poor visibility. The easterly flow from the Russian high was just beginning to inject colder and drier air over the central part of France. This affect was counted on as likely to improve conditions over the battle areas and France, which for the last several days, had generally been slow operational limits, especially over NE France and Eastern England.

c. 23 December 1944.

The improved conditions expected over battle areas and much of France as a further incursion of cold and dry air moved in from the east and reduced cloud to scattered amounts and increased visibility to 1 - 4 miles in 50th Wing area. The fronts backing up from east to west over the areas lost their identity during the day, but the strength of the high pressure over the Isles precluded any incursion of drier or colder air and the very poor visibility of 1000-1500 yards with considerable stratus cloud at less than 800 feet above ground was maintained. These conditions affected 52nd and 53rd Wing bases the entire day.

d. 24 December 1944.

The high pressure area shifted its E-W axis slightly north during the night and provided extreme southern England with a drier air improving visibility much the same as had been over France and battle areas. Some radiational early morning fog was over the continent and 50th Wing with improvement in late morning to 2 - 4 miles and with small cumulus cloud developing. The 52nd Wing area remained near the center of high pressure and a persistent fog and mist condition was thereby forecast due to the lack of circulation and strong temperature inversion forming above the surface with smoke-laden, cold, moist air held to the first few hundred feet with subsidence beginning to reduce cloud above to nil. 53rd Wing, partially affected by the incursion of easterlies was much improved with visibility of 2 - 3 miles and little cloud.

e. 25 December 1944.

A slight decrease of pressure weakened the high pressure over the isles and adjacent continent to allow an Atlantic cold front to finally drive into the Isles as far as norther England, but the ridge of high pressure generally held firm and similar conditions as to the 24th occurred with 50th Wing having nil cloud and visibility 2 - 4 miles. 53rd Wing was affected by melting frost to deteriorate in visibility in afternoon although no more cloud existed in the dry upper air over the 52nd Wing area, the sharp inversion and calm maintained the very foggy conditions.

f. 26 December 1944.

The high pressure over the Isles declined further, but the position of the ridge from Russia to Azores was unchanged and consequently, the

forecast was made for continued stagnant conditions with widespread morning fog and mist with afternoon improvements, mainly over the continent south of Low. Countries, and with cloudless skies. 52nd and 53rd Wings were affected by persistent fog and mist, visibility generally less than 1000 yards all day.

g. 27 December 1944.

The high pressure finally declined enough to allow the penetration of a cold front, rather weak into England from the NW and a slow progress was made by the front to reach south coast England by midnight. Ahead of the front during the day, the 52nd and 53rd Wings were not affected with clearer air and visibility of 100-2000 yards were maintained during the afternoon after intense morning fog conditions. Radiation fog over continent, most serious over Low Countries and NE France and smoke areas kept operational visibilities down most of the day, although 50th Wing recovered to a mile from morning fog. Small amounts of cloud over area, aside from lifted fog locally in form of stratus. The advent of a ridge to move SW-NE over Isles was forecasted for the following day with moderate improvement effected by the cold front which was expected to move further south into France.

9. Resupply to Isolated Unit at MARCURAY, BELGIUM.

a. In accordance with the following message from SHAEF AIR and received at Troop Carrier Command Headquarters on the morning of 23 December 1944, two (2) missions were attempted. The message is as follows:

> "They want 4000 gallons of gasoline, M/T 80, and medical supplies for 1000 men in suitable variety. Approximately four battl ions trapped, location P 439817, town of MARCOURT. Town all in our hands and a drop any place in the town will be OK. There is an identifying circle which is about 60 yards in diameter, color of circle is cerise. This message was received at Versailles at 230400."

b. Fifty (50) aircraft were required for this mission, but due to to the fact that the mission was requested on 23 December to fly on the same day, only thirty (30) aircraft were able to be loaded. First, there was a misunderstanding in regards to the above message received, as it proved the coordinates given were not for the town of MARCOURT, but for MARCOURAY, some 6/10 of a mile east of MARCOURT. However, the Troop Carrier serial of aircraft flew to the point of the coordinates and dropped, but unfortunately they were some four and one-half ($4\frac{1}{2}$) miles south of their target - MARCOURAY. The encircled men, who we were trying to resupply, observed this drop. It may be assumed that the enemy received these supplies. Previous to this mission the discussion of whether to drop a pathfinder team in the town came up and it was decided that their efficiency would be reduced to ineffectiveness due to casualties from the drop and broken equipment when these men tried to land in a town.

c. Route.

(1) The route flown was as follows:

Take off	UNITED KINGDOM
Landfall	CAP GRIZ NEZ
Initial Point	A-86-C

After dropping on the Drop Zone, a left turn was made and the return was made on a reciprocal course.

d. Results.

(1) Of fifty (50) ships requested, twenty-nine (29) took-off, twenty-three (23) delivered, two (2) were shot down, two (2) were diverted to A-83 due to battle damage, one (1) aircraft RON at A-71, and one (1) aircraft is missing.

10. Movement of the 17th Airborne Division to the Continent.

a. On 21 December 1944, this Command was notified by First Allied Airborne Army to move the 17th Airborne Division to FRANCE. This sudden move was due to the enemy situation following the German thrust through the First Army's lines. It was necessary to deliver these troops to the forward area by the fastest available means. It was a Troop Carrier job and the decided method was to be air landings on forward airdromes in FRANCE.

b. A brief conference was held with the G-3, 17th Airborne Division. Seven (7) Troop Carrier airdromes in the United Kingdom, near the 17th Airborne Division, were chosen as the loading airdromes to be used for the tactical move. Seven (7) forward airdromes in FRANCE were also chosen when information was received where these troops were to be employed. A liaison officer from the 17th Airborne Division arrived at this headquarters to coordinate the move. Because of the high commitments of the 53rd Troop Carrier Wing in the task of resupply missions for the 101st Airborne Division and other fighting troops in the line, it was necessary to draw the bulk of the aircraft from the Pathfinder Group, 50th and 52nd Troop Carrier Wings for this mission stationed in the United Kingdom. The following is a list of the airdromes in the United Kingdom and FRANCE which were to be used in transporting the 17th Airborne Division to the forward area.

UNITED KINGDOM		FRANCE	
Membury	Welford	A-63	A-39
Ramsbury	Greenham Common	A-79	A-40
Chilbolton	Chalgrove	A-68	A-41
Aldermaston		A-70	

With the information on hand, a movement table was prepared and the tactical move of the 17th Airborne Division, by units of IX Troop Carrier Command was set up and ready to go.

c. On 23 December 1944, the air lift of the 17th Airborne Division began. The following is a daily summary of this move:

d. 23 December 1944.

(1) Ninety-four (94) aircraft (84 from CHILBOLTON and 10 from ALDERMASTON) of the 50th Wing were utilized to lift men and equipment to A-70.

e. 24 December 1944.

(1) Five hundred and forty (540) aircraft were utilized on this day to lift men and equipment to the Far Shore.

(2) The 50th Wing participated in the following:

(a) Eighty-nine (89) aircraft airlanded personnel and equipment from ALDERMASTON to A-79.

(b) Sixty (60) aircraft from CHALGROVE to A-70

(c) Seventy (70) aircraft from CHILBOLTON to A-70.

(d) Thirteen (13) aircraft from GREENHAM COMMON to A-63.

(3) The 52nd Wing lifted the following in daylight hours:

(a) Forty-six (46? aircraft air landed personnel and equipment from MEMBURY to A-79.

(b) Ninety-one (91) aircraft from CHILBOLTON to A-70.

(c) Seven (7) aircraft from WELFORD to A-39.

(d) Fifty (50) aircraft from RAMSBURY to A-68.

(e) Two (2) aircraft from GREENHAM COMMON to A-63 (in addition, two (2) aircraft aborted due to engine trouble and six were loaded, but did not take-off).

(f) During hours of darkness, using the MIDNITE routes with navigation facilities the 52nd Wing lifted the following:

1. Seventy-two (72) aircraft (2 from MEMBURY and 70 from WELFORD) delivered personnel and equipment to A-79.

2. Twenty-seven (27) aircraft from GREENHAM COMMON to A-63.

(4) The 53rd Wing lifted the following:

(a) One (1) aircraft transported personnel and equipment from GREENHAM COMMON to A-63.

(b) Ten (10) aircraft from WELFORD to A-63.

(c) Two (2) aircraft from WELFORD to A-39.

f. 25 December 1944.

(1) Five (5) aircraft of the 50th Wing airlanded personnel and equipment from CHILBOLTON to A-70.

g. 26 December 1944.

(1) Two hundred and fourteen (214) aircraft were dispatched by the 50th and 52nd Wings to lift personnel and equipment as follows:

(a) Seventy-two (72) aircraft from CHILBOLTON to A-70.

(b) Nineteen (19) aircraft from GREENHAM COMMON to A-70.

(c) Sixty-one (61) aircraft from MEMBURY to A-79.

(d) Forty-nine (49) aircraft from RAMSBURY to A-63.

(e) Thirteen (13) aircraft from WELFORD to A-79.

h. 27 December 1944.

(1) One hundred fourteen (114) aircraft (107 from 52nd Wing and 7 from Pathfinder Group) air landed personnel and equipment of the 17th Airborne Division on the Far Shore as follows:

(a) Thirty-two (32) aircraft from CHALGROVE to A-70.

(b) Forty (40) aircraft from RAMSBURY to A-63.

(c) Two (2) aircraft from WELFORD to A-70.

(d) Forty (40) aircraft from MEMBURY to A-79.

i. 28 December 1944.

(1) Inclement weather prevented any movement of the 17th Airborne Division this day.

j. 29 December 1944.

(1) One hundred and forty-three (143) aircraft of the 50th, 52nd and 53rd Troop Carrier Wings airlanded personnel and equipment from the United Kingdom to A-63 and A-79. This completed the movement of the 17th Airborne Division.

11. Summary of Emergency Missions.

a. The following is a daily summary of the acitivities of the IX Troop Carrier Command in connection with the movement of the 17th Airborne Division to the Far Shore, and the resupply of the US Airborne troops and other isolated units:

DATE	A/B Unit		AIRCRAFT	GLIDERS	LOSSES
23 Dec 44	101st Div	Resupply from UK	241		7
	101st Div	Resupply from Far Shore	21		1
	1000 Troops at MARCOURAY	Resupply from UK	23		2
	17th Div	Troops, Equipment, UK	94		0
			379		10
24 Dec 44	101st Div	Resupply from UK	161		0
	1000 troops at MARCOURAY	Resupply from UK	36		0
	17th Div	Troops, Equipment, UK	540		0
	18th Corps Hq	Troops, Equipment, UK	7		0
	Det 490 QM Co	Troops, Equipment, UK	6		0
			750		0
25 Dec 44	17th Div	Troops, Equipment, UK	5		0
			5		0
26 Dec 44	101st Div	Med Supplies, Far Shore	1	1	0
	101st Div	Resupply from Far Shore	10	10 a/c Gli-Unknown	0
	101st Div	Resupply from UK	289		1
	17th Div	Troops, Equipment, UK	214		0
	Det 490 QMC	Troops, Equipment, UK	17		0
	18 Corps Hq	Troops, Equipment, UK	6		0
			537	11	1
27 Dec 44	101st Div	Resupply from UK	138		
	101st Div	Resupply from Far Shore	50	50	13
	17th Div	Troops, Equipment, UK	114		
	Det 490 QMC	Troops, Equipment, UK	4		
			306	50	13
29 Dec 44	17th Div	Troops, Equipment, UK	143		
	Det 490 QMC	Troops, Equipment, UK	2		
			145		

b. The evacuation of casualties from the Continent to bases in the United Kingdom was not halted during these operations. The aircraft ferrying the 17th Airborne Division, after discharging their loads, were re-routed to evacuation airfields and returned the following number of patients to the United Kingdome on dates indicated:

23 December 1944	878
24 December 1944	531
25 December 1944	0
26 December 1944	954
27 December 1944	908
29 December 1944	1993
TOTAL	5264

c. Movement of the 17th Airborne Division from GREENHAM COMMON area in the United Kingdom to REIMS area consisted of 13,397 personnel. An additional one hundred and eighty seven (187) aircraft will be required to move personal equipment.

Tonnage	1427 Tons
Tonnage to be moved	374 Tons
TOTAL	1801 Tons

	SORTIES	LOSSES
Total resupply paradrop sorties to 101st A/B Div	911	9
Total resupply glider sorties to 101st A/B Div	61	13+
Total resupply paradrop to 1000 troops at MARCOURAY	59	2
Total sorties moving 17th A/B Div to Continent	1297	
Total resupply equipment from UK to 18th Corps	13	
Total equipment from UK to Det 490th QMC	29	
TOTALS	2370	24

NOTE: (+) Thirteen (13) aircraft on this mission have not returned to home bases. Four (4) are known to have been shot down. The status of the remaining nine (9) is unknown, and they are now presumed to be Missing in Action.

ANNEXES:

Annex No. 1 - Battle Damage Report
Annex No. 2 - Route Diagrams (4)
Annex No. 3 - MIDNITE Route Diagram

[redacted] ANNEX NO. 1

UNCLASSIFIED

BATTLE DAMAGE OF IX TROOP CARRIER PATHFINDER GROUP (PROV)
LIST OF THE AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN THE MISSION.
DECEMBER 22 - 24

1st Squadron:

C-47 42-92717 - Two small holes in right rudder. Operational by 0600 hours, 24 December 1944.
" 42-93097 - Several holes in right wing. Operational by 0600 hours, 24 December 1944.
" 42-93542 - Left main fuel tank shot out. Tire and tube shot. Wheel assembly damaged. On the Far Shore, and being repaired by the squadron. Will be returned as soon as flyable.
" 42-93543 - Large hole in right side of the fuselage. Radio compartment badgly damaged. Engine change due to battle damage. Being repaired by the 37th M R&R.
" 42-93681 - Several small arms fire holes in fuselage. Repaired and operational within twenty-four hours.
" 43-15161 - Forced down on the Far Shore. Returned 25 December 1944. Right main and left auxiliary fuel tanks have small arms fire holes. Aircraft AOG, awaiting parts.
" 43-15163 - Returned undamaged.
" 43-15678 - Forced down on Far Shore. Vertical stabilizer shot away, rudder trim tab and fabric full of holes. Rudder trim tab cable needs replacing. Aircraft dropped to 1st TAD.
" 43-30725 - Small holes in left stabilizer. Right engine rough. Operational within twelve hours.
" 43-47963 - Crashed.
" 43-47968 - Small holes in left wing tip and left elevator. Operational within twelve hours.
" 43-47969 - Right main fuel tank damaged. Several small holes in wing and rudders. Fuel tank replaced and aircraft operational within twenty four hours.

2nd Squadron:

C-47 42-92740 - Left main fuel tank shot. Windshield de-icer tank shot. Scattered holes in fuselage and floor. Hole in main junction box. Operational within forty-eight hours.
" 42-93604 - Left tire flat. Scattered holes in right horizontal stabilizer. Damage repaired and aircraft operational in forty-eight hours.
" 42-93683 - Forced down on the Far Shore. Left oil tank shot out, one cylinder of right engine damaged, to be replaced. Hydraulic gauge assembly, one tachometer shot out. Is being repaired by the squadron and will be brought back as soon as flyable.

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

(2nd Squadron cont'd)

C47-.. 42-93752 - Two small calibre fire holes near pilots window. Operational immediately.

" 42-93799 - Forced down on the Far Shore. Both engines shot out and need replacing. Both propellers need replacing. Hydraulic system shot out. Aircraft dropped to 1st T.D.

" 42-108977- Both wings damaged, and will have to be removed and flak holes repaired. Large hole at wing bolts of right wing. Scattered holes around main cargo door. Scattered holes in right upper side of fuselage, Being repaired by the 37th M R&R.

" 43-15200 - Holes in right nacelle. Holes in right engine fire wall. Holes in trailing edge of inboard right wing. Scattered holes around main cargo door. Scattered holes in left horizontal stabilizer and right tire damaged. Operational within twenty-four hours.

" 43-15322 - Crashed.

" 43-15328 - Electrical system shot out. Left auxiliary fuel tank shot out. Scattered holes in fuselage. Operational in twenty-four hours.

" 43-15329 - Hole in right aileron. Left propeller nicked. Scattered holes in rear of pilots compartment. Operational within twelve hours.

" 43-47967 - Scattered holes in right wing and aileron . Numerous holes in center section and flooring. Scattered holes in center section, nose section. Large flak holes in right wing. Hydraulic system shot out. Left tire damaged. Both elevators damaged. Being repaired by the 37th M R&R.

" 43-47974 - Cylinder in right engine needs replacing. Right oil tank shot out. Scattered holes in right engine cowling. Scattered holes in center section, nose section. Large flak holes in right wing. Hydraulic system shot out. Left tire damaged. Both elevators damaged. Being repaired by the 37th M R&R.

C-47B 43-49008 - Returned undamaged.

3rd Squadron:

C-47.. 42-93605 - One hole in rudder trim tab. One hold in elevator. Operational within two hours.

" 42-93606 - Hydraulic line shot out. Right main fuel tank damaged and replaced. Operational within forty-eight hours.

" 42-93680 - Small hole in rudder. Operational immediately.

" 42-93682 - Right wing tip damaged. Operational immediately.

" 42-93821 - Left engine damaged, to be changed. Left propeller dome shot up. Trim tabs controls on rudder and elevators shot away. Right landing wheel

(3rd Squadron cont'd)

and tire damaged. Liaison and command set antennae shot away. Large hole in right side of fuselage, three feet in diameter. Scattered holes throughout fuselage. Aircraft dropped to 1st T.D.

C-47A 42-108969- Small arms in wing tip and in center section. Small arms fire in radio compartment also. Gee set shot out.

" 42-108993 -Returned undamaged.

" 43-48056 - Crashed.

4th Squadron:

C-47A 42-92707 - Vertical stabilizer and rudder shot off. Large flak holes in fuselage and wings. Small calibre holes in fuselage and wings. Vacuum system out. Auto-pilot shot out. Being repaired by the 37th M. R&R.

" 42-92885 - Elevator and rudder cables shot out. Operational within twenty-four hours.

" 42-93079 - Very large flak hole in rear right side of fuselage. Scattered holes in fuselage and wings. Holes in empennage. Being repaired by the 37th M. R&R.

" 42-93096 - Bullet holes in left main fuel tank. Small calibre holes in fuselage. Operational in twenty-four hours.

" 42-93099 - Crash landed on the Far Shore. Specific damage unknown. Aircraft dropped to the 1st T.D.

" 42-93544 - Several small calibre bullet holes in fuselage. Operational within twelve hours.

" 42-93755 - Hole in right oil tank. Several small calibre bullet holes in fuselage and wings. VHF shot out. Operational in eighteen hours.

" 43-47972 - Crashed.

C-47B 43-48266 - Several small calibre bullet holes in fuselage and wings. Aircraft operational in twelve hours.

CHALGROVE

TO 53RD WG. AREA

LASHAM PUNDIT

ASHFORD RADIO RANGE

T.N.

BEACHY HEAD

C. GRIS NEZ

53RD WG. ROUTE
23 A/C TOOK OFF
3 A/C LOST OR MISSING

53RD WG. ROUTE
199 A/C TOOK OFF
1 A/C LOST

A-86 C

A-83

BATTLE LINE DEC. 23, 1944

82ND A/B DIV.

MARCHE

VO 9884

LAROCHE

1000 ISOLATED MEN

101ST A/B DIV. IN TOWN OF BASTOGNE DEC. 23

LE TREPORT

LEGLISE

PATHFINDER ROUTE
42 A/C TOOK OFF
5 A/C LOST OR MISSING
39 A/C BATTLE DAMAGED

SEDAN
A-91

MONTMEDY

A-62

50TH WG. ROUTE
21 A/C TOOK OFF
1 A/C LOST

DECEMBER 23
285 A/C TOOK OFF
10 A/C LOST OR MISSING

A-41

[redacted]

IX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND
NAVIGATION DIAGRAM FOR DECEMBER 23 FOR OPERATIONS "REPULSE"

10 0 10
SCALE IN S.M.

ANNEX NO. 2 TO
OPERATIONS REPULSE REPORT

FLAK LEGEND

SMALL [illegible]
LIGHT
HEAVY

BY AUTH OF TIC
DATE 1 MAR 1945
INITIALS [illegible]
RANK Lt. Col.

AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRODUCTION
DO NOT REPRODUCE



IX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND

NAVIGATION DIAGRAM FOR DECMBER 24 FOR OPERATIONS "REPULSE"

10 0 10

SCALE IN S. M.

ANNEX NO. 2 TO
OPERATIONS REPULSE REPORT

FLAK LEGEND

- ■ SMALL ARMS
- • LIGHT FLAK
- ▲ HEAVY FLAK

DECEMBER 24
197 A/C TOOK OFF
NONE LOST OR
MISSING

TO 53RD WG. AREA

LASHAM
PUNDIT

ASHFORD
RADIO RANGE

T. N.

C. GRIS. NEZ

A-83

53RD WG. ROUTE
289 A/C TOOK OFF
1 A/C LOST

82ND A/B DIV.

BATTLE LINE
DEC. 26

101ST A/B DIV. ENCIRCLED
IN TOWN OF BASTOGNE

VP 4885

VP 3845

50TH

53RD

SEDAN

A-91

MONTMEDY
VP 2806

NOTE: NO IX T.C.C. SORTIES
FLOWN DEC. 25

A-82
PICKED UP LOAD
AT A-82

50TH WG. ROUTE -
2ND SERIAL -
10 A/C & 10 GLIDERS
TOOK OFF, NO LOSSES

50TH WG. ROUTE
1ST SERIAL
1 A/C & GLIDER
NO LOSS OR DAMAGE

A-50

[redacted]

IX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND

NAVIGATION DIAGRAM FOR DECEMBER 26 FOR OPERATIONS "REPULSE"

10 0 10

SCALE IN S.M.

ANNEX NO. 2 TO
OPERATIONS REPULSE REPORT

FLAK LEGEND

- ▪ SMALL ARMS
- • LIGHT FLAK
- ▲ HEAVY FLAK

DECEMBER 26
300 A/C & 11 GLIDERS TOOK OFF 1 A/C LOST OR MISSING

SECRET
BY AUTH OF
DATE
BY
NAME
DEPT

AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRODUCTION

NO.	DATE	REQUESTING AGENCY

TO 53RD WG. AREA

LASHAM
PUNDIT

ASHFORD
RADIO RANGE

T.N.

C. GRIS NEZ

53RD WG. ROUTE
138 A/C TOOK OFF
NO LOSSES

A-83

82ND A/B
DIV.

BATTLE LINE, DEC. 27

FIRMLY ENTRENCHED
ALLIED LINE, DEC. 27

FIRMLY ENTRENCHED
GERMAN LINE DEC. 27

101ST A/B DIV. RELIEVED
BY GROUND FORCES
DEC. 27

VP 3345

VP 4555

50TH WG. ROUTE
32 A/C LEFT TURN
(8 A/C RIGHT TURN)
(WITH NO LOSSES)

53RD

SEDAN

A-91

MONTMEDY
VP 2806

50TH WG. ROUTE
50 A/C & 50 GLIDERS
13 A/C LOST OR MISSING

A-39

SECRET

IX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND

NAVIGATION DIAGRAM FOR DECEMBER 27 FOR OPERATIONS "REPULSE"

10 0 10
SCALE IN S. M.

ANNEX NO. 2 TO
OPERATIONS REPULSE REPORT

FLAK LEGEND

• LIGHT FLAK

DECEMBER 27
188 A/C & 50 GLIDERS TOOK OFF
13 A/C LOST OR MISSING



SECRET

OPERATION

"MIDNITE"

IX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND

SHEETS
- MIDLAND & WALES, NORTH SEA, S.W. ENGLAND, STRAIT OF DOVER — G.S.G.S. 4369
- LE HAVRE, PARIS, NANTES — G.S.G.S. 4072

- LEGEND -

OCCULT — FIXED LIGHT 1 SEC. FLASH EVERY 2 SECS

RADIO RANGE — + PUNDIT

SCALE

SECRET
BY AUTH: C.G. IX T.C.C.
DATE: JAN. 3, 1945
SIG: R.R. Baldwin
RANK: LT. COL.
COPY NO:

AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRODUCTION

NO.	DATE	SIGNATURE & RANK
2503	1/1/45	RRB

DRAWN AND REPRODUCED BY 942ND ENGR AVN TOPO BN 329TH PWR US ARMY JAN. 1945 4624

ANNEX NO. 3 TO OPERATIONS "REPULSE" REPORT