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~~RESTRICTED~~ BIGOT - MARKET

By Authority of:  
CG, 82d A/B Div.  
Initials W. G.  
Date: 13 Sept 44.

Hq 82d A/B Div  
APO 469, U. S. Army  
13 September 1944

FO NO. 11.

Maps: HOLLAND 1/25,000 GSGS 4427 (A.M.S. M831).  
1/100,000 GSGS 4416 & 2541.  
1/250,000 GSGS 4042.

1. a. Annex No. 1 Intelligence.

- b. 21st Army Group now along the ALBERT Canal, with bridgehead at BEERINGEN will advance N across the MAAS, WAAL, and NEDER RIJN to form a strong bridgehead N of ARNHEM and to continue N into HOLLAND and E against the REICH. The main axis of adv is EINDHOVEN - GRAVE - NIJMEGEN - ARNHEM.

A/B Corps composed of 1st British A/B Div, 101st A/B Div and 82d A/B Div will land in the area ARNHEM, NIJMEGEN, UDEN and hold strategic hwy crossings to facilitate the adv of 21 Army Group.

1st British A/B Div, will land in the vic ARNHEM, seize and hold the river and canal crossings at ARNHEM and establish a sufficient bridgehead for passage of the Second British Army.

101st U. S. A/B Div will land units in the general area S of UDEN, seize and hold hwy crossings near NEERPELT (3596), VALKENSWAARD (4007), EINDHOVEN (4318), SON (4425), ST. OEDENRODE (4232), VEGHEL (4838), and UDEN (5343), and insure the adv of the Second British Army.

2. a. 82d U. S. A/B Div, (less dets), will land by Prcht and Gli commencing D Day S of NIJMEGEN; seize and hold the hwy bridges across the MAAS River at GRAVES and the WAAL River at NIJMEGEN; seize, organize, and hold the high ground between NIJMEGEN and GROESBEEK; deny the roads in the Div area to the enemy; and dominate the area shown on Operations Overlay, Annex No. 3.

- b. For boundaries, times and places of departure, DZ's, and LZ's, see Air Movement Tables, (Prcht and Gli) Annex No. 2.

3. a. Force "A", will land by Prcht and Gli during afternoon and evening of D Day, with missions to seize and hold the high ground between NIJMEGEN and GROESBEEK and the highway bridges at NIJMEGEN and GRAVE.

- ✓ (1) 505 Prcht Inf will:

(a) Land on DZ "N"

(b) Seize and hold GROESBEEK

(c) Seize, organize and hold key terrain NW and SW of GROESBEEK. (See Overlay).

(d) Clear, secure and mark LZ "N" for subsequent glider and resupply lifts.

Classification changed to 29 DEC 1944  
~~RESTRICTED~~

b. by AG of S, G-2, WDCB

E. S. JOHNSTON  
Colonel, Infantry

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28 DEC 1944

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- (e) Mop up the area within its sector of responsibility
  - (f) Establish road block at 720520 and be prepared to occupy with one Bn the high ground to the NE thereof on order of Div Comdr. (See Overlay).
  - (g) Establish and maintain contact with 504 Prcht Inf at canal crossings (700539) and (692539) and if necessary in order to gain contact, assist in the seizure of these crossings.
  - (h) Establish and maintain contact with 508 Prcht Inf. (See Overlay)
- ✓ (2) 504 Prcht Inf (with Co 'C', 307 A/B Engrs atchd upon establishing contact) will:
- (a) Land on DZ "O" .
  - (b) Without delay seize and hold MAAS River crossing N of GRAVE at 619542.
  - (c) Seize and hold crossings of MAAS - WAAL Canal at 700539 and 692542.
  - (d) Mop up the area within its sector of responsibility (See Overlay)
  - (e) Mark DZ "O" with PATHFINDER AIDS until completion of landings of Force "B" on LZ's "N" and "T".
  - (f) Establish and maintain contact with 508th Prcht Inf at MAAS - WAAL crossing at 677583.
- ✓ (3) 508 Prcht Inf will:
- (a) Land on DZ "T".
  - (b) Seize, organize and hold key terrain features in area of responsibility, and be prepared to seize WAAL River crossing at NIJMEGEN (714633) on order of Div Comdr.
  - (c) Prevent all hostile movement S of line HATERT (681584) - KLOOSTER (712589)
  - (d) Mop up the area within its sector of responsibility
  - (e) Seize and secure " " .
  - (f) Establish road blocks in area of responsibility. (See Overlay)
  - (g) Establish and maintain contact with:
    - (1) 504 Prcht Inf at MAAS - WAAL crossing at 677583.
    - (2) 505 Prcht Inf. (See Overlay) .
- (4) 376 Prcht FA Bn will:
- Land on DZ "N" and support the atk of the Div. Direct Support - Initially in direct support of 505 Prcht Inf, prepared to mass its fire on GROESBEEK, and Btry positions at 767560 and 769539. It will support GII landings on D and D / 1 Days in LZ "N" and "T", prepared to fire on enemy installations along ridge (7751-8054).

- 2 -

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- c. Force "C" will move by water and join the Div in area directed by CO Force "C".
- x. NO DEMOLITIONS OF ANY KIND AND NO DESTRUCTION OF SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS (except GERMAN field cable) will be allowed except by the express permission of the Div Comdr. This is essential to the swift advance of the Allied Armies.
4. See Adm O No. 1.
5. a. See Sig O, Annex No. 1.
- b. Location of CP. (See Overlay) Units to report.

GAVIN  
COMDG

OFFICIAL:

*Norton*  
NORTON  
G-3

ENCLOSURES:

- Annex No. 1 - Intelligence  
2 - Air Movement Table (Prcht)  
Air Movement Table (Gli)  
3 - Operations Overlay  
4 - Signal Orders  
5 - Artillery Annex

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1 CG	18-19 325 Gli Inf	46-50 101 A/B Div
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3 C/S	22-23 508 Prcht Inf	51-54 2nd Br Army
4 G-1	24-25 504 Prcht Inf	55-56 Div Tran O
5-6 G-2	26-27 Div TSC File	57-58 Army Ground Forces
7-8 G-3	28 319 Gli FA Bn	59-60 C&GS School
9-10 G-4	29 320 Gli FA Bn	61-62 Inf Sch
1 AG	30 376 PPrcht FA Bn	63 1st Br A/B Div
2 CWS O	31 456 Prcht FA Bn	64-66 IX TCC
3 Hq Comdt	32 307 A/B Engr Bn	67 50th TC Wing
4 Provost Marshal		68 52d TC Wing
5-16 CG, Div Arty	33 80 A/B AA Bn	69 53d TC Wing
7 Div Ord O	34 Hq Co 82d A/B Div	70 Div Air O
	35 Hq Btry Div Arty	71 Div Ln O to Br A/B
	36 407 A/B QM Co	Corps
	37 307 A/B Med Co	72-73 First Allied A/B
	38 782 A/B Crd	Army
	39 82d A/B Sig Co	74-100 TSC RES
	40 SHAEF	
	41 21 Army Group	
	42-45 XVII Corps	

- 4 -

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Position Area - Vic 753538. (See Overlay). After landing of Force "B", it will be prepared to displace to positions in zone of action of 504 Prcht Inf, when directed by Div Arty. Direct support - 504 Prcht Inf, prepared to mass its fire on CR 704600, bridges at 672000 and 620000. Position Area - Vic 675553 (See Overlay) Route - Artillery Annex.

- (5) Co's B, C & D 307 A/B Engr Bn will land on DZ "N" and execute missions as follows:
  - (a) Co 'C' atchd to 504 Prcht Inf upon making contact.
  - (b) Co's 'B' and 'D' in Div Res in area indicated.
- (6) Btry "A" 80 A/B AA Bn will land on LZ "N" and assemble in Div Res in area indicated.
- (7) Pathfinders 325 Gli Inf will drop on DZ "T" and mark LZ "T" for Gli landings of Force "B".

b. Force "B" will land in area secured by Force "A" and reorganize without delay.

- (1) 325 Gli Inf (less pathfinders) will:
  - (a) Land on LZ "T" and assemble in Div Res in area indicated.
  - (b) Be prepared to atk toward NIJMEGEN and toward crossings of M.S. - WAAL Canal at 700539 and 692557.
- (2) 82d A/B Div Arty (less 376 Prcht FA Bn) will land by Gli in LZ "N" and "T" on D / 1 Day in accordance with Air Movement Table and support the atk of the Div.

319 Gli FA Bn - Direct Support - 508 Prcht Inf prepared to mass its fire on CR 721598 and 744602.

Position area - Vic 750563 (See Overlay) and prepared to displace forward to position vic 742580.

Routes - Artillery Annex.

320 Gli FA Bn - General Support initially, prepared for direct support of 325 Gli Inf when ordered by CG, 82d A/B Div. It will be prepared to mass its fire on road (713520-754500), bridge at 713525, 700539, 693558, and 677583.

Position Area - Vic 725553 (See Overlay)

Routes - Arty Annex.

456 Prcht FA Bn - Direct support 505 Prcht Inf, prepared to mass its fire on road (713520-754500) and bridges at 713525, 700539, 693558, and 677583.

Routes - Arty Annex.

- (3) 80 A/B AA Bn will assemble in area indicated and await orders.
- (4) 307 A/B Engr Bn will assemble with Prcht elements (less 'C' Co) of Bn in area indicated and furnish security for Div CP.

- 3 -

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- c. Force "C" will move by water and join the Div in area directed by CO Force "C".
- x. NO DEMOLITIONS OF ANY KIND AND NO DESTRUCTION OF SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS (except GERMAN field cable) will be allowed except by the express permission of the Div Comdr. This is essential to the swift advance of the Allied Armies.
4. See Adm O No. 1.
5. a. See Sig O, Annex No. 1.
- b. Location of CP. (See Overlay) Units to report.

GAVIN  
COMDG

OFFICIAL:

*Norton*  
NORTON  
G-3

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4	G-1	24-25	504 Prcht Inf	55-56	55-56 Div Tran O
5-6	G-2	26-27	Div TSC File	57-58	57-58 Army Ground Forces
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9-10	G-4		320 Gli FA Bn	61-62	61-62 Inf Sch
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4	Provost Marshal			68	68 52d TC Wing
5-16	CG, Div Arty	33	80 A/B AA Bn	69	69 53d TC Wing
7	Div Ord O	34	Hq Co 82d A/B Div	70	70 Div Air O
		35	Hq Btry Div Arty	71	71 Div Ln O to Br A/B
		36	407 A/B QM Co		Corps
		37	307 A/B Med Co	72-73	72-73 First Allied A/B
		38	782 A/B Grd		Army
		39	82d A/B Sig Co	74-100	74-100 TSC RES
		40	SHAEF		
		41	21 Army Group		
		42-45	XVII Corps		

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\* By Authority of \*  
\* CG 82d A/B Div \*  
\* Initials: 70A \*  
\* Date: 11 Sept 44 \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

UNCLASSIFIED

HQ 82D A/B DIV  
APO 469, U. S. Army  
11 September 1944

Annex 1 (INTELLIGENCE)  
To  
F. O. 11.

MAPS: 1/25,000 HOLLAND, GSGS 4427 (A.M.S. 1831)  
1/100,000 HOLLAND, GSGS 4416 and 2541.  
1/250,000, HOLLAND, GSGS 4242.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION. See Annex 1 c, "Enemy Order of Battle", and its sub-annexes. Additional information will be disseminated in separate publications as received.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

a. What is the quantity, type, and quality of enemy troops in the NIJMEGEN - GRAVE - GROESBEEK Area, especially as regards SS and Panzer troops?

b. How soon and in what force can the enemy make a coordinated attack against this Division? How rapidly and in what strength can he build up his force against this Division with troops from outside of the NIJMEGEN - GRAVE - GROESBEEK Area?

c. What are the types of enemy defences and where are they located, especially those

(1) On high ground South of NIJMEGEN.

(2) Covering approaches to the bridge over the WAAL at NIJMEGEN, over the MAAS - WAAL Canal in Grid Square 6760, and over the MAAS River at GRAVE (6253).

d. What are the number, caliber and location of enemy AA guns that may be used for fire against ground troops in the NIJMEGEN - GRAVE - GROESBEEK Area?

e. How and where has enemy prepared for demolition the bridges over the WAAL at NIJMEGEN, over the MAAS - WAAL Canal in Grid Square 6760, and over the MAAS River at GRAVE (6253)?

3. RECONNAISSANCE.

a. Div Rcn Plat: Plat CO will report to Div CP upon landing.

b. Units will maintain aggressive reconnaissance 24 hours per day within respective zones of action.

c. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, will coordinate Division and unit reconnaissance.

d. Information from aerial reconnaissance will be disseminated as received.

e. See Paragraphs 3 - 4, Memorandum No. 4, "82d Airborne Division SOP, INTELLIGENCE", this Headquarters, dated 24 February 1944.

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4. PRISONERS OF WAR AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

a. See Paragraph 5, Memorandum No. 4, "82d Airborne Division SOP, INTELLIGENCE", this Headquarters, dated 24 February 1944.

b. See Sections IV and V, Memorandum, this Headquarters, "STANDARD OPERATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES", dated 13 April 1944.

5. MAPS AND AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS.

a. Aerial photographs will be distributed as they become available.

b. Maps will be distributed as they become available.

Map supply is strictly limited, and every means possible will be taken to conserve the available supply.

(2) The least possible number of maps will be carried by seaborne lifts. All other operational maps will be transported by parachute or glider. No operational maps will be left at base camps.

(3) No maps of the UNITED KINGDOM will be taken into the combat area.

c. The 1/25,000 map does not show the new main road from ARNHEM to NIJMEGEN which runs to the East of the old road and the railway; nor does it show the new bridge at ARNHEM (747768).

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. General Security. See Annex 1 d. See also Paragraph 7, Memorandum No. 4, "82d Airborne Division SOP, INTELLIGENCE", dated 24 February 1944.

b. Intelligence Funds: Under direct control of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and will not be sub-allotted prior to commencement of operations. After commencement of operations units may request such funds, assigning reasons.

c. Escape Aids.

(1) A limited number of complete escape purses may be available. They will be issued only upon specific requests from units. Strict accountability will be maintained.

(2) No additional issues of cloth maps, compasses and hacksaws will be made.

d. Accredited correspondents and photographers, bearing proper identification, will be assigned to cover the Division operations. They will be given full liberty of operation but may not interfere with operations. Unit censorship of such correspondents and photographers will not be applied.

e. Censorship. The phrase, "Somewhere in \_\_\_\_\_" may be used in personal correspondence. Personal combat experiences may be related in private correspondence 14 days after they occur.

7. REPORTS.

a. See Paragraph 2, Memorandum No. 4, "82d Airborne Division SOP, INTELLIGENCE", this Headquarters, dated 24 February 1944, for spot and periodic reports to be made by units. In addition:

(1) Capture of any enemy headquarters of company size or larger will be reported to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, by fastest practicable means.

(2) Report of captured stores and payrolls; and Ordnance, Engineer,

Signal, Medical and Chemical equipment will be included in S-2 periodic reports. Spot reports also will be made to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, where the nature or volume of such material warrants it. Captured payrolls will be turned in w/o delay to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

(3) Destruction of any tank or other armored vehicle will be reported promptly to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, with information as to type of tank and unit or units which participated in the operation.

b. Spot reports will be made initially over the Intelligence "300" net, if operative, until telephonic communication is established. Otherwise, the telephone normally will be employed in preference to radio.

c. Division G-2 summaries will be sent daily to units. Spot reports will be forwarded to units as received by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

d. At the close of the operation reports will be rendered by all units as required by AR 345-105, Change 3, Paragraph 10; and Paragraph 43, FM 101-5, as pertains to Intelligence.

e. Reports of IPW, CIC and other Intelligence Specialists attached to units will be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, through Intelligence channels. Important information will be forwarded as spot reports, and recapitulation will be included in periodic reports.

GAVIN  
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

*Winston*  
WINTON  
G-2

Inclosures:

- Annex 1 a Background Information.
- " 1 a (1) Weather; Sun and Moon Table
  - " 1 a (2) Notes on NIJMEGEN Area
  - " 1 b Terrain Study.
  - " 1 b (1) Communications
  - " 1 b (2) Town Plan of NIJMEGEN.
  - " 1 b (3) Bridge Data.
  - " 1 c Enemy Order of Battle.
  - " 1 c (1) Overlay: Enemy OB in Combat Zone.
  - " 1 c (2) Overlay: Enemy Defenses.
  - " 1 c (3) Sketch: Strongpoint in NIJMEGEN.
  - " 1 c (4) Sketch: Location of Demolition Charges in Bridge Over WAAL River.
  - " 1 c (5) Evaluation of Terrain for Airborne Landings.
  - " 1 d Counterintelligence.

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13	Hq Comdt	32	1st A/B Bn	(Br)	
14	Provost Marshal	33	80 A/B AA Bn	51-54	2nd Br Army
15-16	CG, Div Arty	34	Hq Co 82d A/B Div	55-56	Div Tran O
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				61-62	Inf Sch
				63	1st Br A/B
					Div
				64-66	IX TCC
				67	50th TC Wing
				68	52d TC Wing
				69	53d TC Wing
				70	Div Air O
				71	Div Ln O to
					Br A/B Corp
				72-73	First Al-lyed A/B Army
				74-100	TSC RES



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\*Initials: ZBK \*  
\*Date: 11 Sept 44 \*  
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UNCLASSIFIED  
82d A/B DIV,  
U.S. ARMY,  
11 SEPTEMBER 1944.

#### TACTICAL STUDY OF THE TERRAIN

1. PURPOSE. This study is made to determine the influence of the terrain in the vicinity NIJMEGEN - GRAVE - GROESBEEK on the line of action open to an enemy defending against an airborne landing of division size.

#### 2. GENERAL TOPOGRAPHY OF AREA.

a. Drainage System: The main waterways in the area are the WAAL River, the MAAS - WAAL Canal, and the MAAS. In addition the area (except for the NIJMEGEN - GROESBEEK ridge) is crisscrossed by drainage ditches around nearly every field.

##### \* Statistics:

(1) WAAL River: Approximately 800 ft wide; depth dependent on seasonal rainfall. Possible present depth: 8 feet. Dyked banks.

(2) MAAS - WAAL Canal: Width 250 ft; depth 12 ft. Steep banks, with 6½ ft embankments.

(3) MAAS River: Width about 400 ft; depth unknown, but probably approximates that of WAAL.

(4) Ditches: 5 to 12 feet wide; 2 to 6 feet deep. Little or no water in ditches at this time of year.

b. Ridge System. The outstanding elevation in the area (and in all HOLLAND) is the NIJMEGEN - GROESBEEK ridge, rising in places to above 90 metres.

c. Routes: See Annex 1 b (1).

d. General Nature of the Terrain: Flat, damp, and intensely cultivated ground of clay consistency. The woods where found are thick; the NIJMEGEN - GROESBEEK ridge is covered by mixed deciduous and coniferous woods and consists of sand and gravel soil. Roads are all embanked, and vehicular movement off of them in the low portions is impossible. Hedges occur with only moderate frequency and are not formidable in either height or width.

#### 3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN.

a. Avenues of Approach and Lines of Communication: Dictated entirely by roads for large bodies of troops. NIJMEGEN is the hub for a radiating system of main roads.

b. Obstacles: The waterways named in Paragraph 2 a are formidable natural obstacles. The built-up area centering on NIJMEGEN and the high tension line adjacent to and paralleling the WAAL - MAAS Canal on the east are artificial barriers to A/B operations, as are the numerous drainage ditches. Barbed wire strung across the fields east of NIJMEGEN has been discovered thru photographic examination.

c. Concealment and cover offered by ditches, woods, and buildings vary from fair to good.

d. Observation: Excellent from the dominating NIJMEGEN - GROESBEEK

ridge; obtainable from structural elevations and lone hillocks, elsewhere in the area.

e. Fields of fire from good to excellent for all weapons.

4. CRITICAL TERRAIN FEATURES:

a. MAAS River / crossings.

b. WAAL River / crossings.

c. WAAL - MAAS Canal / crossings.

d. NIJMEGEN - GROESBEEK Ridge.

5. TACTICAL EFFECT OF THE TERRAIN. The terrain forces an enemy desiring to hold it to heavily organize the NIJMEGEN - GROESBEEK Ridge and the crossings of the three major waterways. The area is in general decidedly unsuitable for airborne landings from the point of view of good landing grounds, but the obviously key communications and ground warn the defender that it is a tempting target. It is very easy for him to cover with fire and obstacles the best obtainable LZ's and DZ's in the area, which are:

a. Vicinity JONKER BOSCH - BROEKKANT.

b. Vicinity GROESBEEK - WYLER - BREEDEWIG.

c. Vicinity NEERBOSCH - BEUNINGEN - WEURT.

GAVIN  
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

*Winton*  
WINTON  
G-2

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\*Date: 11 Sept 44\*  
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HQ 82D A/B DIV  
APO 469, US ARMY  
11 September 1944

ANNEX 1.a.  
To  
F.O. No. 11

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. GENERAL

a. The Netherlands or Holland as they are popularly known is a low-lying country to the northeast of Belgium. There are no natural frontiers, but the frontiers run through open country and are crossed at many points by numerous roads, rivers, streams, canals and railroads. The large rivers, Rhine, Maas and Scheldt, give the country its specific character as their deltas and estuaries comprise a large share of the territory except for the Northern Provinces. To the extreme south the coastline is also broken up into islands - the Zeeland archipelago, formed by the estuaries of the great rivers.

b. Uniform characteristics are not to be found in this area. In general the people are cool-headed and unexcitable but can be driven to violent action by German repression, as shown by the general strike of May 1943. There are two large centers of population in the area.

Nijmegen. . . . . 98,000  
Arnhem. . . . . 94,000

2. DUTCH POLICE

In general the Dutch Police in peacetime divided into two bodies, the State Police, under central government control, and the Municipal Police under control of the burgomasters. The Germans, however, changed the whole system. They imported their own police forces, the Feldgendarmerie (military police), the Grüne Polizei (special duties, i.e., traffic control) and the Sicherheits-polizei (security police including the Gestapo). They also attempted to nationalize the whole Dutch police and thus insure central control through five police districts, and deprive the burgomasters of their authority. This has, however, only partly been carried out and Arnhem and Nijmegen still possess communal police.

3. GOVERNMENT OF HOLLAND

After the amendment of the Constitution in 1848 whereby ministerial responsibility was introduced, governmental procedure followed very largely the lines familiar in Great Britain, that is to say, no projected legislation could go forward to Parliament, and no order, decree, or law could be promulgated in the name of the Sovereign without the signature of a responsible minister or ministers. Holland is divided into eleven provinces each of which has its own legislative and administrative body.

4. LANGUAGE

The language spoken in the Netherlands has developed from a low German dialect. Owing to the early separation of the Netherlands from the Holy Roman Empire, it has shown independent growth. It is spoken throughout the country with the exception of Friesland and Groningen where Frisian is still the colloquial language and is taught in the schools. There are considerable differences between dialects spoken in different parts of the country, so much so that it is, for example, difficult for southerners to understand those from Groningen in the north. The dialects of the eastern districts to some extent similar to the German dialects on the border. The Flemish and Brabant dialects spoken on either side of the Dutch-Belgian frontier likewise resemble each other. Dutch is also related to English which is an offshoot of it dating from the 17th century.

5. ATTITUDE OF THE POPULATION

German repression in this country has been severe and the popular resentment was such that in 1943 a general strike was called. The action was spontaneous and lacking central control was in fact never really "general" but reached sufficient serious proportions for the Germans to institute an emergency system of police courts-martial. Repressive measures were intensified and NSB (National Sozialistisch Bewegung) members associated themselves with Germans to carry them out. The strike, lacking coordination, was largely a failure. Resistance as such suffered a great setback as a result, and there is no form of armed secret army to compare with the French Maquis. There is, however, passive resistance, for example in factories and workshops "ca' canny", "working to rule", dilatory repairs and so forth. There is evasion of labor-duty for the Germans though it is impossible to say how many Dutch students, teachers, police, doctors and others have been in hiding. It can be stated that in spite of any hard feeling at not having received aid at the time of their uprising, popular sympathy will obviously be pro-Ally rather than pro-German.

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APO 469, US ARMY  
11 September 1944

ANNEX 1.a (1)  
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WEATHER; SUN AND MOON TABLES

1. Climatic Factors. Rainfall in HOLLAND in September is frequent but light. It occurs on more than half of the days of the month, but the average total for the month is only about 2.5 inches. The average temperature for the month is about 60° F. Humidity is high - about 80%, and cloudy and foggy weather is especially common. Winds are generally from the southwest, but seldom of great intensity.

2. Sun and Moon Data. New moon is at 171337 Sept., first quarter at 251307 Sept. Times of sun and moon-rise and set at AMSTERDAM (6° E. Long., 52° N. Lat.) are shown in the following table - times stated in double summer time prior to Sept. 17, in ordinary summer time thereafter:

Sept.	Daylight*	Sunrise	Sunset	Dark*	Moonrise	Moonsset
12		0705	1959		0132	1801
13		0706	1956		0229	1838
14	0553	0708	1954	2111	0331	1908
15		0710	1952		0436	1932
16		0711	1949		0541	1954
17	0459	0613	1847	2003	0547	1913
18		0615	1845		0632	1931
19		0616	1842		0758	1949
20	0504	0618	1840	1956	0904	2008
21		0620	1838		1010	2029
22		0621	1835		1118	2053
23	0509	0623	1833	1948	1226	2123
24		0624	1831		1332	2200
25		0626	1828		1436	2248

\* "Daylight" and "dark" are equivalent to nautical twilight, morning and evening, or the time at which the sun is 12° below the horizon.

3. Effect on Enemy Operations. No aspect of the climate is so pronounced as to affect ground operations strongly. The cloudiness and frequent rainfall will not be particularly favorable to air operations, however, which will be further limited by the progressive contraction of hours of daylight and the absence of a moon during the middle of the month.

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NOTES ON NIJMEGEN AREA

1. The park (VALKHOF) at the South end of the NIJMEGEN bridge has in it a hill surmounted by a tower, in which a sentry is on constant watch. The park has four MG's sited to fire outward from the corners, and has slit and shelter trenches dug in it.
2. The downtown portion just SW of the highway bridge has been severely damaged by USAAF bombers attempting to destroy the bridge.
3. Gestapo Headquarters is at the Hotel Oranje.
4. One half the RR bridge has been converted for automobile traffic, and a road has been built to the northern end.
5. The predominant Dutch color scheme is red, owing to the red brick used almost exclusively in buildings and roads. Roads are brick on sand foundation with sidings holding the roads together - no binding material is used. The red color scheme is varied by white plaster on important buildings and by (infrequent) asphalt on the very important roads.
6. The local woods have little or no undergrowth.
7. Helig Heland is a religious center built as a replica of the Holy Land. It contains a Roman Catholic religious order, and pilgrimages are made to it. The buildings are white.
8. The area south of NIJMEGEN is a national holiday, health and honeymoon site for HOLLAND. It is dotted with chateaux, sanatoria, hotels and similar edifices.
9. Source for above: Capt. A. D. BESTE BREURTIJE Dutch Army Mission to 82nd A/B Div.

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- ANNEX 1.b.(3)

To

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BRIDGE DATA

1. NIJMEGEN Road Bridge - (2541/5 - 714633)

5 span steel br. Central span, bowstring arch, 715 ft. Remainder of spans open steel spandrel arch each 280 ft. Overall length 1960 ft. Width of water 1715 ft. Width of road 35 ft. Estimated from air photos minimum safe class 40.

2. NIJMEGEN Pontoon Bridge - (2541/5 - 712633)

Temporary pontoon bridge alongside main road bridge.

3. NIJMEGEN Railway Bridge - (2541/5 - 705633)

10 span steel bridge. 3 elliptical bowstring arches. 2 through type steel girder and 5 deck type steel girder spans. The latter are on the North banks. Overall length is 2100 ft. Width of water is 1390 ft. Width of road is minimum of 10 ft. Bridge not suitable for quick conversion to vehicular traffic.

4. MAAS-WAAL CANAL - (2541/5 - 682636)

Road bridge over lock. Overall length is 50 ft. Width of water is 50 ft. Width of road is 22 ft.

5. MAAS-WAAL CANAL - (2541/5 - 672618)

Road bridge. Overall length is 320 ft. Width of water is 260 ft. Width of road is 32 ft.

6. MAAS-WAAL CANAL - (2541/5 - 671604)

Road and railway bridge. Overall length of road bridge is 200 ft. plus. Overall length of railway bridge is 380 ft. Width of water is 200 ft. Width of both is 144 ft.

7. MAAS-WAAL CANAL - (2541/5 - 675583)

One span reinforced concrete arch. High embanked approaches. Road bridge with overall length of 250 ft. Width of water is 200 ft. Width of road is 18 ft.

8. MAAS-WAAL CANAL - (2541/5 - 693558)

Road bridge. Width of water is 200 ft.

9. MAAS-WAAL CANAL - (2541/5 - 701539)

Road bridge over lock. Overall length is 85 ft. Width of water is 55 ft. Width of road is 22 ft.


10. MAAS Railway Bridge - (2541/5 - 713527)

7 span steel lattice girder on masonry piers. 3 spans of 240 ft. and 4 of 104 ft. Overall length is 1140 ft. Width of water is 415 ft. Width of roadbed is 22 ft.

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11. MAAS Road Bridge - (2541/5 - 61854)

9 steel bowstring spans, masonry piers and abutments. From E. to W.: 2 spans 150 ft. over land, 1 span 185 ft. over land, 1 span 185 ft. over lock, 1 span 185 ft. and 1 span 150 ft. over river, 3 spans 150 ft. over land. Road surface concrete and approaches embanked. Banks are flat earth, grass covered. Height 3-4 ft. upstream, 6-8 ft. downstream. Overall length is 1785 ft. Width of river is 600 ft. Width of road is 20 ft. plus cycle track. Class is 70.



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HQ 82D A/B DIV,  
APO 469, U. S. ARMY  
11 September 1944.

#### ORDER OF BATTLE SUMMARY

##### 1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.

15 Army is at present engaged in evacuating the OSTEND - GHENT area by ferry across the SCHELDT estuary to the Dutch Islands; having left garrisons in BOULOGNE, CALAIS, and DUNKIRK, it is now estimated to be only three divisions strong.

7 and 5 Pz Armies have formed a line on the Albert Canal and thence south to the ARDENNES, and they have even found it possible to counterattack our bridgeheads over the canal, though without lasting success.

There is no doubt that the enemy has made a remarkable recovery within the last few days, at any rate in the 21 Army Group area. Although we hold ANTWERP, his stand on the ALBERT Canal has enabled 25,000 men from 15 Army to escape North via the Dutch Islands. A captured document indicates that the degree of control exercised over the re-grouping and collecting of the apparently scattered remnants of a beaten army were little short of remarkable. Furthermore, the fighting capacity of the new Battle Groups formed from the remnants of battered divisions seems unimpaired.

##### 2. ENEMY SITUATION IN OPERATIONAL AREA.

Of the seven mobile Bns of 20 Mobile Bde, which used to be in the ZWOLLE - ZUTPHEN region to the NE of ARNHEIM, three have been identified in the main battle. A maximum of four bns with some bicycles but probably few heavy weapons might be encountered.

Of the four divisions, 70, 347, 712, and 719 Infantry, which until a week ago had not been in contact with our troops, it now seems probable that both 712 in the ZEEBRUGGE area and the 70 in the ANTWERP area have been involved in the main battle. One regiment of the 347 Div has been contacted in the NAMUR area. Although nothing definite is known about the 719 Div, it is probable that while part of the division may still be on the islands to hinder our use of the port of ANTWERP as long as possible, part of the division may have been moved on to the mainland.

It is reported that one of the broken Panzer divisions has been sent back to the area north of ARNHEIM to rest and refit; this might produce some 50 tanks. We may therefore reckon that the forces from ROTTERDAM to the German frontier might comprise a regt from 719 Div, a regt from 347 Div, remnants of 70 Div, a few mobile bns, some scraped up static troops and one Panzer division, much the worse for wear.

Photographs, together with ground reports from Dutch sources, indicate that the main direction of German movement is NW to SE; not only is the 347 Div down from the North, but it is definitely established that many of the SS Training Units which were near AMSTERDAM are now quartered in the excellent barracks in NIJMEGEN. It is estimated there are 4000 of these SS troops; moreover, troops are also reported in St Camille's College and the Marienboom Girl's School (see town plan). There seems little doubt that our operational area will contain a fair quota of Germans, and an estimate of a divisional strength in this area may not be far wide of the mark. There are also troop concentrations at TIEL and MAURIK (4176), the latter having the vehicle sign of a white disk with a green horizontal line.

The main features of the photos of 9 September are a sizable increase in flak. In the immediate NIJMEGEN area there are approximately 10 light and 33 heavy guns. Dutch sources state that all flak is sited with an alternative ground role and is exercised in this role.

3. The strengths of enemy divisions in the West as at 1 September are estimated by SHAEF as follows:

(a) Panzer and Panzer Grenadiers Divs.

(1)	1 SS	-	4,000 Men
(2)	2 SS	-	3,000 Men
(3)	9 SS	-	3,000 Men
(4)	10 SS	-	3,000 Men
(5)	12 SS	-	1,500 Men
(6)	PZ LEHR	-	1,500 Men
(7)	2 PZ	-	4,000 Men
(8)	9 PZ	-	3,000 Men
(9)	21 PZ	-	1,500 Men
(10)	116 PZ	-	1,500 Men
(11)	17 SS P.G.	-	2,000 Men
(12)	3 P.G.	-	9,000 Men
(13)	15 P.G.	-	9,000 Men
			<u>45,000 Men</u>

(b) Armoured Reinforcements.

The present tank strength is about 250 tanks. The maximum that can be expected in the way of reinforcements is 350, with a possible 15,000 troops, making a total strength in Panzer troops of 600 tanks, and 60,000 men.

(c) Infantry Divs.

(1)	47 Inf Div	-	9,000 Men
(2)	48 " "	-	6,000 "
(3)	49 " "	-	6,000 "
(4)	64 " "	-	7,000 "
NB (5)	70 " "	-	7,000 "
(6)	77 " "	-	200 "
(7)	84 " "	-	200 "
(8)	85 " "	-	1,000 "
(9)	89 " "	-	200 "
(10)	226 " "	-	6,000 "
(11)	243 " "	-	300 "
(12)	245 " "	-	1,000 "
(13)	271 " "	-	450 "
(14)	272 " "	-	1,000 "
(15)	275 " "	-	600 "
(16)	276 " "	-	100 "
(17)	277 " "	-	1,200 "
(18)	326 " "	-	150 "
(19)	331 " "	-	3,000 "
(20)	338 " "	-	4,000 "
(21)	344 " "	-	3,000 "
(22)	346 " "	-	2,500 "
NB (23)	347 " "	-	10,000 "
(24)	348 " "	-	6,000 "
(25)	352 " "	-	200 "
(26)	353 " "	-	130 "
(27)	363 " "	-	800 "
(28)	708 " "	-	500 "
(29)	711 " "	-	4,000 "
NB (30)	712 " "	-	8,000 "
NB (31)	719 " "	-	8,000 "
(32)	17 GAF	-	600 "
(33)	18 GAF	-	4,000 "
(34)	3 PROHT	-	1,000 "

(35) 5 PROHT DIV - 500 Men  
(36) 6 PROHT " - 4,000 "  
(37) 26 SS PG " - 3,500 "  
(38) 27 SS PG " - 3,500 "  
(39) 30 SS PG " - 8,000 "  
(40) 16 TRNG " -  
(41) 165 TRNG " - Eliminated  
(42) 182 TRNG " -

130,000 Men

These men have extremely inadequate equipment even in infantry weapons. It is not likely that more than 20,000 men are coming up as replacements, making a total of 150,000 men.

Unidentified divisions may account for further 50,000 men in the area, thus giving a total of 200,000 infantry strength.

(d) GHQ Troops.

These are unlikely to number more than 40,000.

(e) 19 Army.

The estimated strength of 19 Army with 64 Corps is 60,000 field troops, with about 100,000 others still trying to evacuate.

(f) Totals. (Field Army)

	<u>Actual Strength</u>	<u>Maximum Potential Strength</u>
Panzer	45,000	60,000
Infantry	130,000	200,000
GHQ	40,000	40,000
19 Army	60,000	60,000
	<u>275,000</u>	<u>360,000</u>

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EVALUATION OF TERRAIN FOR AIRBORNE LANDINGS:

NEUMAGEN AREA

AREA #1

HQ 82d A/B Div  
APO 469, US ARMY  
11 Sept. 1944

The area which extends south of NIJMEGEN to the MAAS RIVER and bordered on the east by the Dekkeswald and on the west by the MAAS-WAAL KANAAL is generally suitable for airborne landings as described:

1. Suitable for parachute landings throughout, avoiding the canal on the west and the wood on the east. A major obstacle in the area itself seems to be the High-Tension lines which run North-South through the area.

2. Suitable for glider landings so long as the glider pilot has reasonable visibility in landing. All major obstacles can be avoided by sight. However, a landing in darkness or semi-darkness would probably not reveal the numerous secondary roads and cart-tracks which appear to be generally sunken. Although some of the public roads are tree-lined, the farm roads appear to have little or no vegetation along them. Small, shallow ditches may border them, but it is more probable the sunken roads themselves provide whatever drainage channels are necessary to carry off the rainfall on the high ground to the east. These roads are, on the average, some 150-200 yards apart, and run for the most part east and west. The cultivated parcels of land between them appear generally unobstructed, except for small, shallow (and dry) drainage ditches which cut the larger parcels of land into smaller plots averaging 30-50 yards wide. This makes the effective size of a smooth, unobstructed glider field approximately 40 x 175 yards. However, the scarcity of hedgerows and other outstanding obstacles in line of approach of the glider will enable the craft to touch down on the very edge of the field and use the full length to brake. Although the fields are often furrowed (apparently for drainage, as in English pasture land) the furrows seem to be very shallow and reasonably sloped, unlikely to be any sort of obstacle to a safe landing. (There is one small section of this area which appears to be cut by the typical deep, water-filled ditches. This is found bordering the canal around BROEKKANT.)

AREA #2

This area extends from GROESBEEK N.E. to WYLER, GROESBEEK E. to HETTSTEEG, and GROESBEEK S.E. to REICHS WALD.

90 per cent of fields in this area are bounded by secondary roads or cart paths. The average size of fields ranges from 70 to 100 feet wide and 200 feet long. Fields contain drainage ditches varying in width from 5 to 10 feet. Some roads are sunken. These roads are approximately 8 to 10 feet wide.

These areas are all suitable for parachute landings and generally suitable for glider landings provided landings are made by daylight or bright moonlight to enable pilot to discern obstacles. Some fields bounded by hedgerows and some by poplars. Average height of hedgerows 4 to 8 feet. Terrain is rolling, sloping generally E. Extreme E. edge of area is valley bordered by hills E. and S.E.

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

SECTION I - SECURITY PRIOR TO OPERATION  
SECTION II - CIC OPERATIONAL PLAN.

SECTION I

1. SECURITY DURING PLANNING.

a. Current directives of this and higher headquarters concerning security and TOP SECRET CONTROL procedure will be strictly enforced.

b. Planning rooms and materials will be protected by all possible safeguards. Frequent security checks will be made.

c. Personnel engaged in planning will be periodically warned against the dangers of carelessness, particularly outside discussion and the carrying away of Top Secret notes or papers. It will be stressed that any breach of security must be reported immediately.

d. Security lectures will be presented to all personnel; the paramount need for security will be impressed and the following security discipline emphasized: The danger of loose speculation about the target area or target date; outside discussion of any preparations indicating time of movement; description of any special equipment or training and of troop strength; the vulnerability of telephone conversations.

e. All personnel will be clearly warned that security violations constitute serious offenses and will be dealt with accordingly. Any such punishments will be publicized within the command.

f. CIC personnel will check upon the prevalence of loose talk in public places. Telephones will be periodically monitored and personnel made aware that such action is being taken.

g. Any compromise of information relating to the Operation will be immediately reported to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 82d Airborne Division.

2. SECURITY AFTER RECEIPT OF ALERT ORDERS:

a. All pertinent security measures set out above continue in force.

b. Physical security of headquarters and troop installations will be intensified to deny access to all unidentified or unauthorized persons. Check will be made to insure that guards and MPs are actually scrutinizing all identification credentials.

c. Loitering at entrances to camps and along camp perimeters by military or civilian personnel will be prohibited. Appropriate signs to that effect will be posted. This prohibition will be strictly enforced to insure that there are no conversations at these points between military and civilian personnel and no opportunity for civilians to stand and observe activities within camps. The handling of British personnel outside camp perimeters must be done tactfully and with due respect to their civil rights along public thoroughfares. Local civilian police will be called upon for assistance in all cases that might involve strained relations. Under no circumstances will Division personnel use force or make arrests of British civilians outside camp perimeters.

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d. The fact that unit has been alerted will not be communicated to outsiders.

e. All letters of enlisted men will be subject to 100% and stringent unit censorship.

f. Personnel will be strictly warned against "farewell parties or calls"; and prohibited from carrying any diaries. Security measures to be enforced during movement will be carefully explained.

g. All reference to units involved in movement will be by unit serial number and not by unit designation.

h. Construction and stenciling of crates will be done indoors if possible and with the minimum conspicuousness. The collection and storage of equipment for movement will not be made obvious.

i. Insofar as possible a vacated headquarters will be manned by a skeleton force to answer telephones and conceal the fact of permanent movement.

j. On orders from this Headquarters bases will be sealed for short period. The object of these sealings will be to conceal the beginning of the actual briefing period and to practice and test the effectiveness of security provisions. During such periods all of the security provisions for the real sealing will be immediately put into effect.

3. MEASURES DURING MOVEMENT TO DEPARTURE FIELDS, CONCENTRATION OR MARSHALLING AREAS:

a. Movement may take place prior or subsequent to sealing.

b. All pertinent security measures set out above continue in force.

c. Personnel will not be told location of departure airfields, concentration or marshalling areas. If movement is by motor, leading drivers will be instructed immediately prior to departure.

d. Responsibility for security discipline rests specifically with each unit's commanding officer. An officer or non-commissioned officer will be designated in each truck to insure that troops do not communicate with civilians, that no letters are mailed or handed out for mailing, and that no telephone calls are made.

e. Halts should be made at thinly populated points; troops will be prevented from wandering about or contacting civilians.

4. SECURITY MEASURES IN SEALED BASES AND SEALED CONCENTRATION OR MARSHALLING AREAS:

a. All pertinent security measures set out above continue in force.

b. Sealing dates will be announced by this Headquarters. In any event, briefing of troops will not be commenced until after sealing. Troop briefing will be commenced at as late a date as is consistent with thorough briefing, generally 48 - 24 hours prior to departure for the combat zone. If time factors permit, briefing will be done on departure fields and in marshalling areas.

c. The following specific measures will be effected:

(1) Twenty-four hour perimeter and interior guard to insure against ingress or egress of unauthorized personnel.

(2) Ingress and egress will be on official business only. Such business must be kept to an absolute minimum. Outgoing divisional personnel will be specifically selected for their discretion. Incoming non-divisional personnel,

civilian or military, will be accompanied by an armed guard while within the base if there is any doubt as to their identity or fidelity.

(3) Ingress and egress from all camps will be only on presentation of pass, dated and signed by the base commander on or subsequent to the date of sealing. Passes will include a physical description of the holder, the purpose of his visit in or out of the base, the time authorized for him to be in or out of the base. Commanding and staff officers from higher headquarters will be admitted without pass if they carry a Bigot classification card or its equivalent, provided their identity has been established.

(4) Outgoing telephone calls will be restricted to essential official conversations by commissioned officers. Incoming telephone calls of an unofficial nature will not be accepted by the individual called. However, such calls will be answered in a manner as will not disclose the sealing of the base or the imminence of departure of individual units. Both incoming and outgoing telephone calls will be monitored.

(5) Personnel sent to hospitals will be strictly admonished regarding security precautions.

(6) Unit commanders will impress the men in their units that there must be no talk, in the proximity of unauthorized personnel regarding the sealing of the camps, including the fact that the camps have been sealed and the troops restricted, and any speculation as to the possible intent of the procedure.

(7) All letters will be 100% unit censored and bagged for forwarding Special Mail Section, Base Censor 2, APO 887.

(8) Check will be made to determine that each unit has a plan for emergency destruction of documents, including proper incendiary material and designated personnel.

(9) Individually owned cameras will be impounded by unit commanders. These may be returned to owners just prior to takeoff and then be taken into the combat zone. No pictures will be taken prior to arrival in the combat zone.

(10) Attached and service units and individuals, military or civilian, will be subjected to the same restrictions as troops.

5. SECURITY MEASURES AT AND AFTER TIME OF BRIEFING.

- a. Every possible security measure will be intensified.
- b. All pertinent security measures set out above continue in force.
- c. All personnel not enplaning or embarking will be segregated before briefing begins and will be kept segregated to the fullest practicable extent.
- d. Packaged operational maps will be kept under armed guards from time of receipt.
- e. Issue of operational maps to troops will be not sooner than 24 hours immediately prior to briefing and not until sealing has been effected.
- f. Only official telephone calls and telegrams, approved by the Camp Commander, will go out.
- g. Below Divisional level only the following documents will be taken into the combat zone by parachute or glider:

(1) Officer's Identification Card, Form 6 - 1.

(2) Officer's Pay Data Card, Form 77.

(3) Soldier's Individual Pay Record, Form 28.

(4) Immunization Register, Form 81.

(5)



- (5) Unmarked maps.
- (6) Countersigns by specifically designated individuals.
- (7) Essential SOI extracts by specifically designated individuals.
- (8) Glider and parachute loading manifests as directed by this Headquarters.

h. The above prohibitions apply equally at Division level, except that specifically designated staff officers may carry in by parachute or glider certain essential extracts that cannot be memorized, in which case the extracts will be excised, garbled, and rearranged so as to be meaningless except to the owner.

i. Attached and service units and individuals, military or civilian, will be subjected to the same restrictions as troops.

j. Personnel evacuated to hospitals will be admonished and strictly segregated.

6. SPECIAL SECURITY MEASURES AT DEPARTURE AIRFIELDS:

- a. All pertinent security measures set out above continue in force.
- b. Because of the peculiar problems presented at each field, direct contact and coordination between the Air Force, Airborne and SOS senior commanders and their representatives at each airfield will be necessary.
- c. The security of the airfield itself, and of its perimeter in particular and all Air Force personnel, is the responsibility of the senior Air Force officer.
- d. The senior 82d Airborne Division unit commander at each field is responsible for the security of all 82d Airborne Division personnel, the bivouac area and facilities allotted to him, and the security of SOS personnel attached to his command.
- e. The issue of passes will be the responsibility of the senior Air Force commander at each field. He will provide the necessary perimeter guards. Airborne unit commanders will make application to him for passes required by them or their servicing personnel.
- f. A large percentage of Air Force personnel will not be briefed and will not enplane. Their segregation from other Air Force personnel is the responsibility of the senior Air Force Officer. The segregation of Airborne troops from them is the responsibility of Airborne unit commanders.
- g. In the event of damage to aircraft necessitating a landing in the UNITED KINGDOM, the senior officer or enlisted man in the plane or glider is responsible for all security provisions until released by competent authority.

SECTION II

1. REFERENCES: Memorandum No. 4, 82d Airborne Division SOP, "INTELLIGENCE", 4 February 1944.

2. STATUS AND FUNCTION OF CIC: The CIC operates under the direct supervision of the Division Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, except when attached to a subordinate unit, in which case it operates under the direct supervision of the Unit S-2. The senior CIC officer or non-commissioned officer will initiate all routine CIC activities. He will present to G-2, or S-2, specific detailed recommendations to cover present and anticipated CIC action and employment. These recommendations will be based upon the tactical situation. Because of the limited number of CIC personnel available, counterintelligence missions such as seizures and searches in towns and villages will require the employment of additional personnel. CIC functions in



The combat zone include the following:

- a. Arrest of known and suspected enemy agents, collaborationists, sympathizers, etc.
- b. Search and seizure in buildings, billets, and installations known or suspected to contain documents of intelligence value.
- c. Search and seizure in enemy communication centers for codes, cipher devices, directories, and records.
- d. Seizure and control of enemy and civil electrical communications facilities.
- e. Seizure and impounding civilian mail, telegrams, and associated records and funds, until they are taken over by Civil Affairs or censorship personnel. Such material will be guarded locally and not evacuated.
- f. Search and seizure of hidden armaments, radios, or other equipment not surrendered or reported in accordance with proclamation.
- g. Seizure of enemy films in motion picture houses and private photographic establishments.
- h. Protection against sabotage of all strategic public and private installations whose continued operation is essential to the Allied Forces.
- i. Enforcement of observance by civil population of all security provisions contained in proclamations and orders issued by Civil Affairs Staff.
- j. Investigation of cases of suspected espionage and sabotage.
- k. Arrangement with Civil Police for strangers in the area to be brought to attention of CIC.
- l. Assistance in enforcement of civil movement control; advice on establishment of civilian pass and identity systems, check on enforcement of such systems by local police. Investigation and recommendation of disposition of pro-Axis element, and hostile political factions of civilian population.
- m. Contact local persons known to be friendly to the Allied cause in order to procure all possible information of value.
- n. Coordination with Provost Marshal and Civil Affairs Officer with respect to security requirements involved in marshalling refugees and other civilians arriving from occupied territory.
- o. Assistance to Civil Affairs Staff in establishment of a reliable civil administration. CIC will arrest civil officials without consulting Civil Affairs only when continued liberty of such officials represents a threat to security.
- p. Investigation of cases involving subversive influences emanating from civilian population and likely to affect Allied forces adversely.

3. CIC TOWN TARGET: NIJMEGEN.

4. When CIC personnel are not attached, unit S-2s will use available intelligence personnel to perform CIC functions.

5. REPORTS.

a. Spot Reports.

(1) Entry into town.

- (2) Capture of known enemy agents and dangerous civilians.  
(3) Investigations of civilians.  
(4) Any intelligence of major importance.
- b. Daily and weekly reports to Division and Corps G-2s.  
c. Daily log or diary by Detachment and each sub-detachment.  
d. Dossier of persons under investigation.

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I. ADQUARTERS XVIII CORPS AIRBORNE  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

:Auth: CG XVIII:  
: Corps AB:  
:Init: WJ:  
:Date: 11 Sep 44:  
:.....:

Sheet 1 of Sheets.  
Copy of Copies

APD 109, U.S. Army  
11 September 1944

OPERATION "MARKET"

PRELIMINARY TACTICAL STUDY OF THE TERRAIN

1. PURPOSE.

To study the area of operations of the 82nd and 101st AB Divisions in Operation "MARKET".

2. GENERAL TOPOGRAPHY OF AREA

a. Drainage. The area is drained towards the NW by the ROMMEL, AA, and LETGRAF Rivers in the EINDHOVEN-VEGHEL-UDEN area, and to the W by the MAAS, through GRAVE, and the WAAL, through NIJMEGEN. Virtually the entire area is thickly veined with drainage ditches and canals. The principal canals are the MEUSE-ESCAUT, running E-W through the extreme S end of the area; the S branch of the WILLEM Canal, running to the NW near VEGHEL; the WILHELMINA, to the W just N of EINDHOVEN, and the MAAS-WAAL, connecting those two parallel rivers just W of NIJMEGEN.

b. Ridge System. Virtually none, except for one very pronounced N-S ridge about 5 miles long, between NIJMEGEN and GROESBEEK, rising to 200 to 300 feet above the polder-land. (A polder is the land surrounded by a dike, and generally below river or sea-level.)

c. Routes.

(1) Highways. The entire sector lies astride one of the principal highway routes from HASSELT to the N of HOLLAND. In addition, a National Highway runs SE-NW through EINDHOVEN, with a secondary road to the E. National Highways converge on NIJMEGEN, from the SE, S, and the SW, the latter passing through GRAVE. Northward from NIJMEGEN, a National Highway splits after crossing the WAAL and merges again a few miles S of ARNHEIM.

(2) Railroads. One railroad runs S-N through VALKENSWAARD to EINDHOVEN, then swings E and NW. Another connects VEGHEL and UDEN, running generally WSW - ESE. Two lines converge from S and W at NIJMEGEN and continue N.

d. General Nature of the Terrain. Flat, below river-level, cut by dikes and ditches; sprinkled with small patches of woods.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN.

a. Avenues of Approach and Lines of Communication. Only feasible approaches are along the roads and railroads. Cross-country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. Communications are dependent upon possession of bridges, or alternative water-borne transport on the canals and rivers.

b. Obstacles. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches. The countryside can be inundated.

c. Concealment and Cover. Generally available only in the patches of woods, villages, and farm buildings, and behind dikes or in ditches.

d. Observation. The NIJMEGEN-GROESBEEK ridge affords excellent observation in all directions for that sector. Elsewhere, only the dikes, occasional small

elevations of 20-30 feet above the polders, and church steeples, offer the only vantage points.

e. Fields of Fire. Good for all types of weapons.

4. CRITICAL TERRAIN FEATURES.

a. The NIJMEGEN-GROESBEEK Ridge.

b. Crossings over the WAAL River, the MAAS River, the WAAL-MAAS Canal, the AA River, the WILLEM Canal, the DOMPEL River, the WILHELMINA Canal and its feeder at EINDHOVEN, and the ROUSE-ESCUT Canal.

5. TACTICAL EFFECT OF THE TERRAIN.

Possession of the above-mentioned terrain features by our forces would block the enemy's withdrawal to the E and force him into the N. His escape route then would be cut to a 30-mile-wide neck between the MAAS River and the ZUIDER ZEE.

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ANNEXES:

- A - Rivers and Canals
- B - Air Fields
- C - Weather
- D - Order of Battle
- E - Strategic Engineering Study of Terrain

DISTRIBUTION:

82nd AB Div - 150 copies  
101st AB Div - 150 copies  
G-2, FAAA - 2 copies  
I.O., Br AB Force - 2 copies

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ANNEX NO. 2 (2d Revised) to FO NO. 11

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L2 - T

AIR MOVEMENT TABLE - GLIDER AND RESUPPLY

(D+1 - Bomber)  
(D+2 - C-47)  
(D+3 - C-47)

By Authority of  
CG, 82da/B Div  
Initials XX  
Date: 15 Sept 44

Hq 82d A/B Div  
APO 459 U.S. Army  
15 September 1944

Serial	Airborne Unit	Unit	No of A/C (Chalk)	Nos of Gliders	Take-off Airfield	L2	Gliders Available for loading	Equipment loading completed by	Gliders ready for Emplaning	Emplaning Completed	Time of Take Off	Time of Drop or Land	Re-marks
A-1	Btry A 80th Atr Support Party Hq Div Arty Rcn Plat Sig Co Hq, 82d A/B Div	439		22 2 2 6 6 12	BALDERTON	N	D Day					H+0101	
A-2	Comd Veh Pchnt Btry B 80th 307 A/B Engrs 307 A/B Med Sig Co Corps Rad	439		6 32 5 16 1	BALDERTON	N	D + 1					X+0017	
A-3	307 A/B Engrs 307 A/B Med	313		4 36	FOLKINGHAM	N						X+0024	
A-4	319 GI FA Bn Hq 82d A/B Div	61		31 9	BARSTON HEATH	T						X+0031	

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- BIGOT - MARKET  
AIR COUNCIL TACTIC  
GLIDER AND RESUPPLY  
OPERATION - MARKET

Date: 15 Sept 1944  
Hqs 82d A/B Div  
APO 469, U. S. Army

Serial	Airborne Unit	USTCC Unit	No of A/C (Chalk)	Nos of Gliders	Take-off Airfield	DZ or LZ	Gliders available for loading	Equipment loading completed by	Gliders ready for Emplaning	Emplaning Completed	Time Take off	Time of Drop or Landing	Remarks
A-5	319 G11 FA Bn Hq 82d A/B Div 407 A/B Ord Co 782d A/B Ord Comd Veh 504	316		8 21 4	COTTES MORE	T		D 71 (Contd)				X/40038	
A-6	Hq & Hq Btry 319 G11 FA Bn	440		8 32	FULBECK	T						X/40045	
A-7	307 A/B Med 82d A/B Sig Co Comd Veh 505	441		15 21 4	LANGAR	N						X/40052	
A-8	320th G11 FA Bn	313		40	POLKING- HAM	N						X/40059	
-9	320th G11 FA Bn	61		40	BARISTON HEATH	T						X/40106	
A-10	320th G11 FA Bn 456th Precht FA Bn	316		19 21	COTTES- MORE	T						X/40113	
A-11	456th Precht FA Bn Hq & Hq Btry	440		27 13	FULBECK	T						X/40120	
A-12	456th Precht FA Bn	441		40	LANGAR							X/40127	
	Resupply		135 Bombers										

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**- BIGOT - MARKET**  
**AIR MOVEMENT TABLE - GLIDER AND RESUPPLY**

Hq 82d A/B Div  
APO 469 U.S. Army  
15 September 1944

Serial	Airborne Unit	USMC Unit	No. of A/C's (Chairs)	No. of Gliders	Take-off Airfield	LZ	Gliders Available for Loading	Equipment loading completed by	Gliders ready for Emplaning	Emplaning Completed	Time Take off	Time of Drop or Land- ing	Remarks
A-13	325 GI Inf	313		49	FOLKINGHAM	T	D + 2					2 Hour	
A-14	325 GI Inf	61		40	BARKSDON HEATH	T						2+0007	
A-15	325 GI Inf	316		40	COTTESMORE	T						2+0014	
A-16	325 GI Inf	440		40	FULBECK	T						2+0021	
A-17	325 GI Inf	316		40	LANGAR	T						2+0028	
A-18	325 GI Inf	313		49	FOLKINGHAM	T						2+0035	
	Resupply		142 C-47's			N							
A-19	80 A/R AA Bn Comd Veh 508 Rcn Plat	316		40 4 4	COTTESMORE	T	D + 3					2 Hour	
A-20	MP Plat 80 A/B AA Bn Rcn Plat	440		4 36 8	FULBECK	T						2+0007	
A-21	307 A/B Engns 80 A/B AA Bn MP Plat	441		36 6 6	LANGAR	T						2+0014	
	Resupply		210 C-47's			N							

Note: Serial numbers as shown represent the order of lift within the Division only. Times of take-off and landing based on H, X & Z as follows:

H - 1400 hr  
X - 1000 hr  
Z - 1000 hr

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PLAN - BIGOT - MARKET  
AIR MOVEMENT TABLE - GLIDER  
OPERATION - MARKET

Date: 14 Sept 1944  
Hqs 82d A/B Div  
APO 469 U.S. Army

Serial	Airborne Unit	USMC Unit	No of A/C (Chalk)	Nos of Gliders	Take-off Airfield	DZ or LZ	Gliders available for loading	Equipment loading completed by	Gliders ready for Emplaning	Emplaning Completed	Time of take off	Time of Drop or Landing	Remarks
A-6	Hq & Hq Btry 319 GI FA Bn	440		21 32	FULBECK	T	D + 1 (Cont'd)					X+0045	
A-7	307 A/B Med 82 A/B Sig Co Comd Veh 505	441		15 21	LANGAR	N						X+0052	
	Resupply		187			N							
A-8	325 GI Inf	313		49	FOLKINGHAM	T	D + 2					Z Hour	
A-9	325 GI Inf	61		40	BARKSTON HEATH	T						Z+0007	
A-10	325 GI Inf	316		40	COTTESMORE	T						Z+0014	
A-11	325 GI Inf	440		40	FULBECK	T						Z+0021	
A-12	325 GI Inf	316		40	LANGAR	T						Z+0028	
A-13	325 GI Inf	313		49	FOLKINGHAM	T						Z+0035	
	Resupply		142			N							

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AIR MOVEMENT TABLE - GLIDER  
OPERATION - MARKET  
(TO INCLUDE RESUPPLY BY C-47)

By Authority of  
CG, 82d A/B Div  
Initials JH  
Date: 14. Sept 44.  
Hq 82d A/B Div,  
APO 469, U. S. Army  
14 September 1944.

Serial	Airborne Unit	STCC Unit	No of A/C (Chalk)	Nos of Gliders	Take-off Airfield	LZ	Gliders Available for loading	Equipment loading completed by	Gliders ready for emplaning	Emplaning Completed	Time Take Off	Time of Drop or Landing	Remarks
A-1	Btry A 80th Air Support Party Hq Div Recn Pl Sig Co Hq, 82d A/B Div	439		22 2 2 2 6 6 12	BALDERTON	N	D Day					H/0101	
A-2	Comd Ven Archt Btry B 80th 307 A/B Eng 307 A/B Med Sig Co Corps Radio	439		6 22 5 16 1	BALDERTON	N	D + 1					X/0017	
A-3	307 A/B Eng Bn 307 A/B Med Co	313		4 36	FOLTINGHAM	N						X/0024	
A-4	319 Glider FA Bn Hq 82d A/B Div	61		31 9	BARKSTON HEATH	T						X/0031	
A-5	319 Glider FA Bn Hq 82d A/B Div 407 A/B QM Co 762 A/B Ord Comd Vch 504	316		20 8 4 4 4	COTTES MORE	T						X/0038	

BIGOT - MARKET

Plan - "Resupply By C-47"

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Page No. 3 of 3 pages

- BIGOT - MARKET  
AIR MOVEMENT TABLE - GLIDER  
OPERATION 5 MARKET

Date 14 Sept 1944  
Hqs 83d Air Div  
APO 469, U.S. Army

Serial	Airborne Unit	USOC Unit	No of A/C (Chalk)	Nos of Gliders	Take-off Airfield	DZ or LZ	Gliders available for loading	Equipment loading completed by	Gliders ready for Emplaning	Emplaning Completed	Time of take off	Time of Drop or Landing	Remarks
A-14	80 A/B A.V. Bn Comd Veh 508 Rcn Plat	316	40	40 4	COTTES MORE	N	D / 3					Z Hour	
A-15	MP Plat 80 A/B A.V. Bn. Rcn Plat	440	36	36 8	FULBECK	N						Z / 7	
A-16	307 A/B Engr 80 A/B A.V. Bn MP Plat	441	36 6	36 6	LANGAR	N						Z / 14	
	Resupply		167			N							

Note: Serial numbers as shown represent the order of lift within the Division only. Times of take-off and landing based on H, X & Z as follows:

H - 1400 hr  
X - 1000 hr  
Z - 1000 hr

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ANNEX NO 2 to FO NO 11

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Date: 13 Sept 44.

AIR MOVEMENT TABLE - PROHIT  
OPERATIONAL - MARKET

Date 13 Sept 1944

Hq 82d A/B Div

APC 469, J. S. Army

DZ N  
DZ O  
DZ F

Airborne Unit (include designation of serial CO)	RAF USTCC Unit	No of A/C (Chalk)	Nos of Gliders	Take-off Airfield	DZ	A/C and Gliders available for load- ing	Equipment loading completed by	Chutes issued by (BRITISH only)	A/C ready for emplan- ing	Emplan- ing com- pleted	Time of take- off	Time of drop or Land Mark ing	P/F Aids and DZ Mark ings
A-2 82d P/F (504 Precht Inf)	IX TCC	2 1-2		D Day (only one lift) N. WITHAM	O								Beacon Eureka Violet Smoke Yellow "m"
A-7 505 Precht Inf	313 Gp	45 1-45		FOLKINGHAM	N								Green Smoke White "m"
A-8 505 Precht Inf Hq 82d A/B Div	313 Gp 313 Gp	43 46-88 2 89-90		FOLKINGHAM "	N "								
-9 Hq 82d A/B Div 505 Precht Inf	316 Gp 316 Gp	7 1-7 38 8-45		COTTESMORE "	N "								
A-10 504 Precht Inf	316 Gp	45 1-45		COTTESMORE	O								As for "O" above
A-11 504 Precht Inf	315 Gp	45 1-45		SPANHOE	O								
A-12 504 Precht Inf	315 Gp	45 1-45		SPANHOE	O								
A-13 307 A/B Engr Bn 82d A/B Div Arty	439 Gp 439 Gp	27 1-27 3 28-30		BALDERTON "	N "								As for "N" above

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**AIR MOVEMENT TABLE - PROCT**  
**OPERATION - MARKET**  
**CONFIDENTIAL**  
Date 13 Sept 1944  
Hq 82d A/B Div  
APO 469, U. S. Army

Serial	Airborne Unit (include designation of serial CO)	RAF USTCG Unit	No of A/C (Chalk)	Nos of Gliders	Time of Take off Airfield	DZ	A/C and Gliders available for load- ing	Equipment loading completed by	Chutes issued by (BRITISH only)	A/C ready for empland- ing	Emplan- ing com- pleted	Time take off	Time of Drop or Land	P/F Aids and LZ Mark- ings
A-20	325 P/F 508 Prcht Inf	441 Gp 441 Gp	2 1-2 43 3-45		LANGAR "	T "								Red Smoke Cerise upn
A-21	508 Prcht Inf	441 Gp	45 1-45		LANGAR	T								
A-22	508 Prcht Inf	440 Gp	42 1-42		FULBECK	T								
A-23	376 Prcht FA Bn	440 Gp	48 1-48		FULBECK	N								As for upn above

NOTE: Times of take-off and drop to be given later.

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By authority of:

CG 82d A/B Div.

Initials:           

Date 13 Sept 44

Hq 82d A/B Div

APO 469 U.S. Army

13 September '44

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ANNEX NO. 5 (Artillery)

to

FO NO. 111

MAP: HOLLAND 1/25,000 GSGS 4427, Sheets 6 SW, 12 NW.

1. a. Annex No. 1 to FO No. 11.

b. (1) See paragraph 1. b., FO No. 11.

(2) The 82d A/B Div (less dets) lands in daylight by prcht and glider in the area S of NIJMEGEN, seizes, clears, and secures the general area GRAVE - MARIENBOOM - KRANENBURG (exclusive). The 505 Prcht Inf will secure LZ "N" for subsequent glider and resupply lifts, secure GROESBEEK and the key terrain to the W and SW, and mop up the area within its sector of responsibility. The 504 Prcht Inf will secure crossings of MAAS - WAAL Canal (700539 and 692557), secure MAAS River crossing at GRAVE, and mop up the area within its sector of responsibility. The 508 Prcht Inf will secure LZ "T", secure designated key terrain features in area of responsibility, prevent all hostile movement South of line DE PLOEG and BEEK, and mop up the area within its sector of responsibility. The 325 Glider Inf will land on LZ "T" and assemble in Div res in area indicated.

2. The 82d A/B Div Arty lands by prcht and glider in vic of GROESBEEK, in accordance with air movement table, Annex No. 2 to FO No. 11, Hq 82d A/B Div, and supports the atk of the Div.

3. a. Hq and Hq Btry, 82d A/B Div Arty, will land by prcht and glider on D/LZ "N".

(1) The prcht element will proceed to Div Arty Hq, make route rcn and furnish guides at LZ "N" for glider element.

(2) CP - See overlay.

b. 376 Prcht FA Bn will land by prcht on LZ "N".

(1) Initial mission. In direct support of 505 Prcht Inf but prepared to fire in zones of action of 504 Prcht Inf and 508 Prcht Inf in emergency. It will be prepared to mass its fire on GROUND and enemy battery positions at 767560 and 769500. It will support glider landings on D and D / 1 days on LZ "N" and LZ "T", prepared to fire on enemy installations along ridge 7751-8054.

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**[REDACTED]** - BIGOT - MARKET

Page No. (2) of 3 pages.

- (2) Mission after landing of Glider Arty - On orders of Div Arty Comdr, displace toward West and furnish direct support to 314 Prcht Inf being prepared to mass its fire on RJ 64600 and bridges at 672604 and 620542.
- (3) Positions:  
a) Initial position area - vic 753538 (see overlay).  
b) After displacement - vic 675553 (see overlay).
- c. 319 Glider FA Bn will land by glider on LZ "T".  
(1) Mission: Direct support 508 Prcht Inf prepared to mass its fire on CR 721598 and CR 744602 and bridge at 672601.  
(2) Position area: Vic 750563 (see overlay), and prepared to displace to vic 742580.
- d. 320 Glider FA Bn will land by glider on LZ "N".  
(1) Mission: General support of Div. Furnish direct support to 325 Glider Inf on order of Div Comdr. Be prepared to mass its fire on road (713527-754500), bridges at 713525, 700539, 693558, 677583.  
(2) Position area: Vic 725553 (see overlay).
- e. 456 Prcht FA Bn will land by glider on LZ "T".  
(1) Mission: Direct support 505 Prcht Inf, prepared to mass its fire on road (713520-754500) and bridge at 713525.
- x. (1) Firing chart: 1/25,000 map.  
(2) Survey: By Bn.  
(3) Alternate positions will be selected for each btry.  
(4) Reserve 40 rds/how (5 rds smoke, 15 rds HE w/M48, 20 rds HE w/M54) for fire on call by Div Arty.  
(5) Smoke will not be fired except as aid to adjustment unless authorized by Div Arty Comdr.  
(6) No restrictions on time for opening fire.  
(7) Fire will be restricted to prescribed zone of action (supported unit) unless cleared through Div Arty, except that emergency missions on observed targets may be fired until wire communication to Div Arty is first established.  
(8) 319, 320, and 456 will send rcn parties, landing at LZ "N" to select positions, routes and OPs and furnish guides for respective bns on arrival (See Air Movement Table).  
(9) Make ground rcn for best routes to initial position area and for displacement.  
(10) Bns will use concentration numbers from blocks assigned as follows: 319 (101-199); 320 (201-299); 376 (301-399); 456 (401-499); Div Arty (1-99).  
(11) 3-3 reports to be submitted in duplicate daily, as of 1800, to reach Div Arty Hq by 1930.

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Page No. 13 of 13 pages.

4. a. Ammunition: Units will carry additional arty am in seaborne vehicles as space permits.
- b. Reports: All administrative reports required by Hq 82d A/B Div will be forwarded through Hq 82d A/B Div.
- c. For further details see Am O No. 1 Hq 82d A/B Div.
5. a. Current SOI.
- b. See overlay. Arty Bn CP locations to be reported to Div Arty as soon as selected.

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|----------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1 CG                 | 36 407 A/B QM Co            |
| 2 Asst CG            | 37 307 A/B Med Co           |
| 3 C/S                | 38 782 A/B Ord Co           |
| 4 G-1                | 39 82 A/B Sig Co            |
| 5-6 G-2              | 40 SHAEF                    |
| 7-8 G-3              | 41 21 Army Group            |
| 9-10 G-4             | 42-45 XVIII Corps           |
| 11 AG                | 46 101 A/B Div              |
| 12 CWO               | 47-50 Hq A/B Corps (Br)     |
| 13 Hq Comdt          | 51-54 2d Br Army            |
| 14 PM                | 55-56 Div Trans O           |
| 15-16 CO, Div Arty   | 57-58 Army Ground Forces    |
| 17 Div Ord O         | 59-60 C & GS Sch            |
| 18-19 325 G1 Inf     | 61-62 Inf Sch               |
| 20-21 505 Prcht Inf  | 63 1st Br A/B Div           |
| 22-23 508 Prcht Inf  | 64-66 IX TCC                |
| 24-25 504 Prcht Inf  | 67 50th TC Wing             |
| 26-27 Div TSC File   | 68 52d TC Wing              |
| 28 319 G1 FA Bn      | 69 53d TC Wing              |
| 29 320 G1 FA Bn      | 70 Div Air O                |
| 30 376 Prcht FA Bn   | 71 Div Ln O to Br A/B Corps |
| 31 456 Prcht FA Bn   | 72-73 1st Allied A/B Army   |
| 32 307 A/B Engr Bn   | 74-100 TSC Res              |
| 33 80 A/B AA Bn      |                             |
| 34 Hq Co 82d A/B Div |                             |
| 35 Hq Btry Div Arty  |                             |

~~SECRET~~ - BIGOT - MARKET



Page No. 1 of 3 Pages  
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•By Authority of •  
•CG 82d AB Div. •  
•Initials RSF •  
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Hq. 82d AB Div.  
APO 469. U.S. Army  
14 Sept. 1944

ANNEX NO. 4  
to  
F.O. 11

SIGNAL ORDERS

1. Signal Operation Instructions Index No. 1-203 is in effect with assault edition Index No. 1-1 to be used for the first three days.

2. (a) Communication within the division will be in accordance with present Standard Operating Procedure except as amended by this annex.

(b) RADIO SECURITY: Transmission in the clear will be allowed during the first four hours after dropping. However, no mention of the numerical designation or size of units will be made in the clear.

(c) CODES AND CIPHERS: In addition to those codes prescribed in the SOI the following PLACE-NUMBER code will be used where practicable: Code numbers in addition to general location refers to precise location designated by coordinates.

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>
1	NIJMEGEN	706621
2	BAD WYLER	764599
3	WYLER	781582
4	ROAD JUNCTION	790548
5	HILL	790524
6	MOOK	720519
7	BRIDGE	7034
8	BRIDGE	692558

<u>CODE NO.</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>
9	BRIDGE	676382
10	BRIDGE	671604
11	BRIDGE	620542
12	HILL 848	735552
13	SANATORUM	730576
14	BERGAN DAL	746592
15	GROESBEEK	751551
16	ARNHEM	7478
17	UDEN	5342

(d) WIRE: When existing open wire is utilized, Infantry and Signal Units will use circuits beginning from top of pole. Artillery units will use lower circuits.

3. Communication between higher and adjacent headquarters:

(a) RADIO: See appendix 1 to annex 4.

(b) The southern elements of the 1st BR AB Div. will have SCR-300 Radio on Channel #33 to make initial contact with northern elements of this division. The 1st BR AB Div. will use the code name DRAGON for this contact.

(c) The 101st AB Div. will use the same SOI as this Division for the first three days.

#### 4. DZ-MARKINGS

DZ \* "O" - Violet smoke  
Yellow fluorescent "T"

DZ - "T" - Red smoke  
Cerise "T"

DZ - "N" - Green smoke  
White "T"

5. Signal Supply Dump location to be announced.

GAVIN

Commanding

OFFICIAL:

*Norton*  
NORTON (us)  
G-3

